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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of financial sector foreign direct investment (FSFDI) on
economic growth by estimating a panel data model for 11 Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs)1 between 1996 and 2003 in a cross-country growth accounting framework.
The analysis concentrates on the efficiency channel linking FSFDI to economic growth. The
results clearly indicate that there can be a relationship between FSFDI and economic growth.
Approaching a medium degree of financial M&A is rewarded by higher economic growth after
two periods. Beyond it, FSFDI seems to spur economic growth depending on a higher human
capital stock. FSFDI-induced knowledge-spillovers to domestic banks can be an explanation
for this phenomenon. Above a certain threshold, the crowding-out of local physical capital
caused by the entry of a foreign bank seems to hamper economic growth. The value of
the paper lies in (1) providing novel data on FSFDI in CEECs, (2) analyzing the impact
of FDI on a sectoral level and (3) in modeling the hitherto only qualitatively discussed
relationship between foreign banks and economic development into a structural, econometric
model that combines two streams of economic research: the FDI-growth-literature and the
finance-growth-literature.
Keywords: Financial sector foreign direct investment, economic growth, financial economics,
transitional economies, panel data analysis.
JEL classification: C23, F36, G10, O16, P2
Finance-growth nexus homepage: http://fgr.wu-wien.ac.at/institut/ef/nexus.html.
1the New EU Member States and Accession Countries, i. e. Bulgaria (BG), Croatia (HR), Czech Republic
(CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovenia
(SI), Slovakia (SK)
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1. Introduction and Motivation
Banks were inefficient and burdened with large amounts of non-performing loans in former
socialist Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) before 1990 (Fink, Haiss, Or-
lowski & Salvatore 1998). Capital was scarce and overall productivity low. The inflow of
foreign capital – in particular foreign direct investment (FDI) – was seen as a key component
for a solution of these problems (Sergi 2004). Accordingly, economic research has developed
two different streams of literature. On the one hand, various studies have attempted to pro-
vide theoretical and empirical answers to the question of the overall impact of general FDI
on the host economy. In this context the impact of FDI on economic growth has especially
been analyzed (e. g. Borensztein, De Gregorio & Lee 1998, De Mello 1999, Nair-Reichert &
Weinhold 2001, Campos & Kinoshita 2002, Mencinger 2003, Dimelis & Louri 2004, Ruschin-
ski & Sturm 2004, Hansen & Rand 2004, Neuhaus 2005, Sohinger 2005). Results for CEECs
are mixed but they argue that FDI can be a major growth trigger. On the other hand,
the finance-growth nexus literature has elaborated meaningful links between the financial
sector and economic growth over the last decade. Blum, Federmair, Fink & Haiss (2002)
reviewed this literature and detected five different patterns of interference: a leading role
of the financial sector (supply-leading approach), a demand-following, a bi-directional link,
negative causality from finance to growth and no link. The direction of the causality link
may change with the level of economic development (Rousseau & Wachtel 2005). Patrick
(1966) points out that the financial sector plays a supply-leading role in underdeveloped mar-
kets. Cross-country studies such as Beck, Levine & Loayza (2000) generally seem to support
the supply-leading link. Time-series studies and regional studies as Al-Tamimi, Al-Awad
& Charif (2001) provide mixed evidence for this link. The positive view of the finance-led
growth hypothesis normally focuses on more open and liberalized financial systems. Banking
markets in CEE are an extreme case of openness as they are majority-held foreign.
While there is a plethora of literature on the consequences of financial sector foreign
direct investment (FSFDI) for the host countries’ financial system and also some descriptive
analysis especially in the context of CEE countries (e. g. Naaborg, Scholtens, Bol, De Haan
& De Haas 2003, Vessel 2003, Baudino, Caviglia, Dorrucci & Pineau 2004, Goldberg 2004,
BIS 2004, Uiboupin 2004), empirical evidence on the economic impact of sectoral FDI is
scarce (see Appendix C for an overview of related studies). This paper is one of the first
attempts to fill this gap. The paper adds to the understanding of economic mechanisms
by combining the two aforementioned streams of research: the FDI-growth-literature and
the finance-growth-literature. We argue that the effects of FDI might differ depending on
the target industry. While government ownership has been investigated with regard to
its economic implications (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer 2002), the growing
importance of foreign ownership and underlying FSFDI has not been treated properly in the
literature, too.
Reviewing the aforementioned streams of research, we are able to identify four important
transmission channels linking FSFDI to economic growth. We observe that FSFDI induces
a variety of micro-structure changes in the host countries. Among them, potential efficiency
improvements for the whole financial sector are of specific relevance. We thus test for the
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hypothesis that economic growth is led by FSFDI-induced efficiency gains. Using two dif-
ferent indicators for FSFDI we are going to estimate the impact on economic growth in 11
CEECs from 1994 to 2003. We adapt a cross-country growth accounting model to render
the efficiency channel and employ fixed-effects panel data estimations.
This paper progresses as follows: Section 2 characterizes the transmission channels between
FSFDI and economic growth, Section 3 presents the stylized facts of the FSFDI-growth
nexus and its transmission in the CEECs, Section 4 develops the theoretical model following
endogeneous growth theory, Section 5 emphasizes econometric particularities of the panel
data approach used for growth econometrics, Section 6 elaborates the empirical model and
presents the estimation results, Section 7 summarizes the main findings and depicts directions
for future research.
2. Transmission Channels Between FSFDI and Economic
Development
The recent rise in FSFDI especially in emerging markets led to a renewed research emphasis
on this field. Questions analyzed include why, which and where banks go abroad (e. g.
Clarke, Cull, Peria & Sánchez 2001), privatization and ownership issues (e. g. Bonin, Hasan
& Wachtel 2005, Sabi 1996, Weill 2003) and what is the impact on host and home countries’
financial system (e. g. Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga 2001, Herrero & Sirnon 2003,
De Haas & Van Lelyveld 2006), frequently based on theories of multinational banking (e. g.
Williams 1997). Direct investigations of the impact of FSFDI on economic growth and
development are scarce (Levine 1996). We try to fill this gap.
In the following sections we emphasize possible benefits and drawbacks of foreign bank
entry on financial sector and economic development with particular focus on CEE. In this
way, we seek to identify transmission channels through which foreign ownership in banking
may affect economic development. We are able to summarize four different channels: inter-
mediation / efficiency, intermediation / credit volume, corporate governance & institution
building, as well as signal effects for total FDI and portfolio investments (see Figure 1 and
Haiss, Steiner & Eller (2005)). The status quo of empirical attempts testing these different
transmission channels is summarized in Appendix C.
2.1. Transmission Channel I: Intermediation / Efficiency
Acquiring advanced technology and accumulating capital stock more effectively are the major
challenges for sustained growth in the CEECs (Lee & Tcha 2004). Most transition countries
possess relatively high-quality human capital stock (i. e. have a well-trained workforce), while
the physical capital stock had been rather obsolete and in need of modernization through
investment across the various economic sectors. With the lack of domestic investment (DI),
FDI is usually argued to play a critical role in the transfer of market-oriented technologies
and business practices and by contributing to the accumulation of physical capital in the real
and in the financial sector (Dimelis & Louri 2004). We empirically investigate this technology
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Identified Transmission Channels 
Intermediation / Efficiency:  
FSFDI ↑ spread ↓ cost of capital ↓ investment ↑ GDP ↑ 
Intermediation / Credit Volume: 
FSFDI ↑ credit availability ↑ investment ↑ GDP ↑ 
Corporate Governance & Institution Building:  
FSFDI ↑ bad loans ↓ GDP ↑ 
Signal Effects:  
FSFDI ↑ FDI & PFI ↑ GDP ↑ 
GDP FSFDI 
Figure 1: Identified Transmission Channels between FSFDI and Economic Growth
channel in financial sector FDI. Figure 2 depicts the respective line of argumentation, which
is explained in detail in the following.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
gGDP 
 
• Strategic reorientation, 
• implementation of 
internal group standards, 
• clearing of risky credit 
portfolios (bad loans). 
 
 
FSFDI 
 
• FS development, 
• sounder monitoring, 
• knowledge transfers, 
• technology changes, 
• better risk management. 
 
• Lower operational costs, 
• more efficient capital 
allocation, 
• higher productivity, 
• lower interest spreads. 
• Increasing FS 
competition, 
• efficiency gains for  
the whole FS, 
• overall reduction of 
transaction costs 
Figure 2: FSFDI-Induced Efficiency-Led Growth
2.1.1. Efficiency of Foreign Owned Banks in Emerging Markets
Bonin et al. (2005) and Claessens et al. (2001) analyze samples of mature and emerging
markets and point out that foreign banks operating in emerging markets have been more
efficient with regard to costs and profits than domestic banks, whereas the opposite is true
in the case of mature markets. Let us stress subsequently the related arguments.
Strategic issues: Strategic reorientation on the market and technology changes in case of an
acquisition may enhance efficiency. As foreign institutions enter new markets, their strategic
interests will vary according to their home market or global activities. Most investors in
emerging banking markets have long-term profit interests as these markets offer the potential
for strong business volume growth across the various client groups, including retail banking
(BIS 2004). Such “going local” strategies may help local financial market development, e. g.,
by the implementation of products new to the host market (Gallego, Herrero & Luna 2003).
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In the case of an acquired bank, the integration into a multinational or even global financial
organization leads to a migration of strategic decisions to the foreign headquarters whereas
day-to-day responsibilities remain at the local level (BIS 2004, 10). Close ties to the parental
institution also derive from the access to parental resources which might be a stable funding
base in times of crisis. Possible negative impacts might occur as shocks may be imported
from the home market (BIS 2004). De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2006) find that there is a
significant negative relationship between home country economic growth and host country
credit by greenfields in CEE. Conversely, they conclude that during host market crisis periods
domestic banks contracted their credit base, whereas greenfield foreign banks did not.
Management issues: Acquired banks usually receive a capital injection from the new owner
(Papi & Revoltella 2003, 160), so the ability of the target to bear risk and grant fresh credit
rises. Particularly foreign banks have great interest in implementing sound policies and risk
management as they have the capacity to implement group-wide risk assessment techniques
(BIS 2004, 15). Furthermore, foreign banks play an important role in reducing the share
of non-performing loans that was and still is high particularly in former state owned banks
(Sergi & Matoušek 2005) (for more details see Subsection 2.3.1 and Table 2). Papi &
Revoltella (2003, 160) support this view and argue that the clearing of risky credit portfolios
requires majority interest by the foreign bank and takes time due to restructuring needs.
Putting these arguments together, efficiency in risk management is achieved through transfer
of know-how and technologies as well as economies of scope due to risk-diversification.
Operational efficiency: Foreign banks will have a great interest in implementing internal
group-standards. Standardization across borders may be difficult to achieve. Drawing on
US-experience, Goldberg (2004, 6) argues that foreign banks are likely to have more efficient
credit allocation as well as sound monitoring and thus less risk. Their operating costs are
lower. Claessens et al. (2001) explain the high foreign bank presence in the CEECs with low
banking costs and low non-interest income of domestic banks. Sabi (1996) and Weill (2003)
find that foreign banks are more profitable and more effienct than domestic-owned banks in
the CEECs. Green, Murinde & Nikolov (2004), on the other hand, points out that foreign and
domestic owned financial organizations are not necessarily different with regard to economies
of scale and scope. Concerning acquired institutions, Papi & Revoltella (2003, 175) argue
that “for operating and thus cost efficiency a majority interest of at least 70 percent in
the host bank capital is necessary”. Cost efficiency can be realized only after a period of
experimental learning in the new market and restructuring in the case of acquisitions.
These previous issues suggest that foreign owned banks can exploit higher efficiency. How-
ever, respective empirical investigations come up with mixed results. Havrylchyk (2006)
concludes for Poland that greenfield banks have achieved higher levels of efficiency than
domestic banks, foreign banks that acquired domestic institutions have not succeeded in
enhancing their efficiency. Green et al. (2004), who tested eight CEE financial markets from
1993 to 2000, found that cost efficiency is not always dependent on ownership. Foreign
owned banks are not more efficient than an average domestic bank in terms of economies
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of scale and scope. An explanation for these results might be that foreign owners have up-
front costs in modernizing the acquired banks. Cost efficiency might only occur after some
time. Nevertheless, foreign owned banks are more profit efficient according to Bonin et al.
(2005, 2158). They analyzed data of 67 banks in six CEE countries from 1994 to 2002.
Papi & Revoltella (2003) provide an explanation for the contradictory findings about the
relationship between ownership and bank efficiency on which we will draw in interpreting
our empirical analysis. They argue that a certain threshold in foreign ownership is necessary
to achieve changes in efficiency levels of the acquired bank. But, what about the impact on
domestic banks and thus the whole financial sector? How is financial sector efficiency linked
to economic development?
2.1.2. Efficiency Spillovers on the Whole Financial Sector
Foreign ownership may drive down banks’ interest rate margins, thus lower companies cost
of borrowing which should facilitate investment. Foreign owners may have a direct impact
on efficiency gains in loan portfolio management of the affiliate and thus external finance for
investment by corporations and households. Better risk management or lower operating costs
allow for more efficient capital allocation. Foreign banks are able to set narrower interest
margins and offer their services and products at lower prices. Local as well as regional
competition among banks will increase (Drakos 2003). These changes in the competitive
structure of the banking industry may induce efficiency gains in the whole sector as argued
by most of the discussion on efficiency (Goldberg 2004, 5). Koivu (2004) found evidence
that increasing financial sector efficiency measured by interest margins has growth-enhancing
effects on economies in transition. She applied cross-country and time-series regressions on
nine CEE countries over 1995–2002. Claeys & Van der Vennet (2004, 2) empirically tested
the determinants of interest margins in CEE and found that “institutional reform shifts risk
behavior before competition effects push margins down”. Higher competition induced by
foreign bank entry causes lower interest margins and thus higher financial sector efficiency.
According to Eschenbach, Francois & Schuknecht (2000), financial sector competition trig-
gered by foreign banks is closely linked to economic growth in emerging market economies.
Their cross-country regression analysis covered 130 countries, including most of the transi-
tion countries over 1990–1999. Higher financial sector efficiency induced by higher financial
sector competition should result in an overall reduction of transaction costs (Levine 1997).
Greenfield investors represent new competitors per se, whereas acquisitions foster compe-
tition due to new market policies implemented by foreign owners, restructuring, and the
rollout of group risk systems and corporate governance practices. If domestic banks are able
to cope with foreign contenders, competition with foreign banks will improve the efficiency
of the domestic banking system (see Claessens et al. 2001).
But one has also to consider, that banks will need to refocus their business and specialize
on (other) new target groups (e. g. SMEs) what will lead to higher costs for domestic banks.
They might succeed by offering services more closely tailored to the needs of the local
population and not by trying to compete on price with foreign competitors which are mostly
backed by large financial groups. They might also be crowded out as foreign owners “cherry
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pick” and only riskier target groups remain. Periods of severe instability in the financial
sector might follow (IADB 2005, Papi & Revoltella 2003).
While competition will increase, particularly cross-border mergers and acquisitions con-
tribute to an increase of concentration in the financial systems of emerging market economies
(BIS 2004, 21). This might be a simple effect of transition reflecting the deepening of host
country financial sectors that demand host country supervisors to monitor this development.
Foreign bank entry also exposes local markets to competition among CEE (or even global)
countries. External shocks may have an impact on the activities of foreign owned banks in
the host market, e. g. through the reduction of foreign operations. The recent diversification
of Spanish banks away from a previous concentration on Latin America by acquiring banks
in Italy and the UK could be interpreted this way. Altogether, these issues point out that
foreign owned banks may create an environment where the entire financial system is forced
to become more efficient, with interest rate margins and thus lending rates under severe
downward pressure. This is important for the investment climate, economic growth and
development (Rossi, Schwaiger & Winkler 2004, 77).
2.2. Transmission Channel II: Intermediation / Credit Volume
Well-capitalized foreign owners my provide a higher volume of credit to the host countries’
companies. In CEE and other emerging markets, bank lending is the most common method
of external financing and thus important for investment activities. Credit to the private
sector remains relatively low, although it is most important for investment activities. Wach-
tel (2003, 44) points out that “deeper financial intermediation may be a significant causal
factor in economic growth”. To put it differently, well-capitalized foreign owners providing
a higher volume of credit to the host countries’ companies might contribute to investment
and thus growth. But Wachtel (2003, 44) argues that “one cannot infer that every expansion
of intermediary activity will be beneficial”. As foreign owned banks hold increasingly high
shares in banking assets in emerging market economies, it is crucial to look at the role that
foreign owned banks play in credit allocation.
De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2002) show that local credit by foreign owned banks to domestic
credit as well as to GDP2 rose in the 90ies, except for Slovenia. The Slovenian financial mar-
ket was opened to foreign institutions in 1998. In contrast, Engerer & Schrooten (2004) find
no empirical evidence for an impact of foreign bank entry on financial depth in terms of credit
volume in eight CEE countries over 1995–2002. The impact of foreign bank entry on credit
supply in general depends on the form of market entry. In the case of an acquisition, the
existing client base is maintained, not necessarily changing the credit volume. Restructur-
ing may shift the focus to different target groups and requires a cleaning of non-performing
loans (Naaborg et al. 2003). If a new subsidiary is established, the number of financial in-
termediaries will increase. In both cases better risk assessment allows foreign owned banks
to finance higher risk/return projects. They have the ability to provide fresh money to the
2One has to consider that credit to GDP may be only a rough measure. Particularly in transition economies,
“the small size of the private sector may have restricted its credit growth as a share of GDP” (Koivu 2004,
49) and may therefore distort the picture of credit growth.
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financial host market because foreign owned banks are backed by their parent companies.
These issues on foreign bank entry affect a foreign banks’ behavior in the host market and
lead to higher competition. The impact of foreign bank lending on capital accumulation—
consequently on investment and economic development—depends on the lending practices
to different target groups (the private and the public sector) and on their reaction in times
of economic downturn.
2.2.1. Impact of Lending Practices on the Private and the Public Sector
Credit supply to different target groups has various impacts on economic development. Lend-
ing to the private sector is necessary to further support private investment, whereas providing
finance to an efficient state and thus improve infrastructure efficiency can be a major way
to reasonably foster economic growth during transition (Fink, Haiss & Vukšić 2004).
Concerning the private sector, Bol, De Haas & De Haan (2003, 15) argue that foreign
financial institutions are more involved in lending to the private sector than domestic banks
in CEE. The rising involvement of foreign banks in private sector credit may have a posi-
tive impact on investment activities. According to Papi & Revoltella (2003), foreign bank
lending is mostly directed to subsidiaries of multinational corporations because the assess-
ment of information coming from the local private sector is often too difficult due to missing
transparency or even lack of information. Mehl & Winkler (2003, 17) find for South-Eastern
Europe that foreign owned banks “cherry picked” the best borrowers, particularly those from
their own country of origin. The economy will grow below potential if this is the case. But
foreign banks can also be primarily involved in retail banking, such as most Austrian banks
in CEE Breyer (2004) and contribute to extend credit to the private sector compared to do-
mestic banks. They seem to have replaced domestic banks as creditors. Credit to the private
sector is on the rise from a comparatively low level according to Naaborg et al. (2003).
Credit to the public sector exceeds credit to the private sector in foreign owned as well
as domestic banks in CEE (Bonin et al. 2005). Fink et al. (2004) applied panel data and
cross-section regressions on a sample of nine CEE and 18 developed countries (1996–2000).
They found that domestic credit, which includes private credit as well as credit to central
and local governments, was more important for growth than private credit. Koivu (2004)
supports these results applying a fixed effects regression analysis on 25 transition countries.
These results are different from most theoretical and empirical literature because the above
mentioned estimations use data on domestic credit. The specific characteristics in the acces-
sion countries account for these results. The results suggest that credit to the public sector
may be growth-enhancing as well, because foreign banks finance budget and current account
deficits (Breyer 2004, 73). This creates a certain mutual dependency of the public and the
financial sector. In turn, the interest of foreign banks in an efficient, sound, regulated, and
stable financial sector is aroused in order to mitigate country risk and promote economic
development.
The effects of foreign owned bank lending are unevenly distributed among firms showing
differences in e. g. size. Foreign bank entry therefore affects lending to SMEs and overall
industrial structures particularly in industries that are dependent on bank finance. Small
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local businesses mostly rely on relationship lending (IADB 2005, 136)). In many developing
and transition economies, banks are highly involved in relationship lending. In other words,
companies owned by related individuals may receive funding even if they are operating
inefficient whereas potentially highly profitable projects may face problems in search for
funding. Foreign owned institutions often “do not serve” relationship lending. They stick to
international standards and may thus enhance allocative efficiency, contribute to institution
building over the long run and enhance overall stability as well as sustainable economic
development.
Interestingly, Giannetti & Ongena (2005) found that young enterprises that were estab-
lished after the early transition period profited more from foreign bank entry. They focused
on lending practices of foreign owned banks in a sample of 14 CEE countries from 1993 to
2002. The results showed that firms established in early transition received less lending from
foreign owned banks. According to them, this may suggest that foreign owned banks might
be able to mitigate problems of related lending as these firms mostly had worse corporate
governance, had less dispersed ownership and benefited from favors of politicians. In which
way these firms nevertheless contribute to economic growth shall not be discussed, however,
the implementation of sound and international standards is crucial for stable economic devel-
opment. In contrast, Vanassche (2004) showed that financial integration positively affected
the external financing situation of older and more mature firms. A possible explanation is
that information for such firms is easier available than for new ventures. Developing and
transition economies face large information asymmetries. Therefore, foreign owned banks
have information disadvantages. The use of soft information in lending decisions requires
a decentralized organization because it is difficult to pass soft information within a bank.
Within foreign banks, decision making is often not that much decentralized because of a
lack of local expertise or local personnel may be considered untrustworthy. Therefore, SMEs
may profit to a lesser extent from financial integration than large and established companies.
This does not necessarily imply a negative impact on SMEs. The application of international
standards by foreign owned banks may enhance allocative efficiency, contribute to institu-
tion building over the long run and enhance overall stability as well as sustainable economic
development, i. e. support SMEs investment environment positively.
These issues were acknowledged by international organizations as the EU. According to
Bruckbauer & Gardó (2004, 37), the offering of structural funds by the EU to the CEE
member states was seen as a potential tool for stepping up lending to SMEs as banks had
an opportunity to co-finance loans from these funds. For example in the Czech Republic,
banks provided information for SMEs on how to qualify for the structural funds and they
conducted pre- and co-financing.
To sum up, foreign banks are more involved in lending to the private sector than domestic
banks. Foreign lending stimulates firm growth in sales, assets, and leverage via investment
activities (Giannetti & Ongena 2005). Countries experienced higher growth rates when they
had higher investment to GDP ratios. Among other reasons, efficient or inefficient allocation
of resources contributes to differences in growth (Wachtel 2001, 339).
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2.2.2. Lending Practices, Financial Sector Stability and Economic Development
Growing credit supply is not enough to guarantee a positive impact on investment activities
and thus economic development. Fast credit growth can also be a warning signal indicating
a potential financial crisis (Mehl & Winkler 2003). A lending boom may for example reflect
an accumulation of bad loans such as in the Czech Republic at the end of the 90ies when
private sector credit to GDP attained relatively high levels. In addition, countries can
experience high rates of savings and investment, but have poor economic growth such as in
the case of the former Soviet Union. Saving rates as well as investment rates used to be
high, but machinery and equipment were scarce. What was the reason? Capital was simply
not allocated in an efficient way (Wachtel 2001, 338). These examples show that the quality
of lending as well as efficient credit allocation seem to be significantly more important for
economic performance than mere lending volumes (Giannetti & Ongena 2005). This calls
once more for the evaluation of the efficiency channel rather than sticking only to the credit
volume as the sole intermediator.
Empirical evidence on the possible stabilizing influence of foreign ownership is provided
by Engerer & Schrooten (2004) who analyzed eight CEE countries from 1995 to 2002. Their
results as well as evidence provided by the IADB (2005) emphasize several advantages of
foreign owned banks in this regard. Foreign parent companies might act as a lender of last
resort to their local units and related private institutions. Furthermore, foreign owned banks
are less exposed to local default risk due to the higher degree of global (risk) diversification
and their often long-term interest. Beyond it, they argue that less volatile deposits and
higher loan quality of foreign owned banks compared to domestic banks add to it. Better
disclosure, accounting, and reporting practices as well as stronger prudential supervision are
crucial for positive impacts of foreign bank entry on lending practices and financial sector
stability.
De Haas & Van Lelyveld (2002) argue that there is at least no evidence of a persistent
decrease in foreign credit during adverse economic times. They outline that recessions and
crisis may lead to a temporary decrease in cross-border credit, which is then offset by foreign
subsidiaries’ credit. In addition, the presence of foreign banks within borders may encourage
domestic depositors to keep their money within the domestic financial system in times of
economic or financial distress because foreign banks are often recognized as being healthier
and more efficient than domestic ones in transition countries (Levine 1996, Goldberg 2004).
From a macroeconomic point of view, this “flight to quality” may be better than capital
flight out of the country.
There are arguments supporting procyclical lending practices of foreign subsidiaries (e. g.
Goldberg 2004). Foreign owners may also have lower exit costs, depending on the organiza-
tional form of market entry. They may be more sensitive to shocks in the host country and
cut back on local operations rapidly (IADB 2005, 134). If lending becomes overly procycli-
cal due to foreign banks behavior, credit swings will affect financial sector stability strongly.
Goldberg (2004) points out that foreign banks as procyclical lenders do not appear to mag-
nify the boom-boost cycles in emerging markets. If foreign owned banks were inclined to
contribute to the overall soundness of the local financial market, financial crisis risks would
decline and greater stability may foster economic development.
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2.3. Transmission Channel III: Corporate Governance & Institution Building
From the perspective of most CEE host countries, financial markets were opened to for-
eign investors with the aim of a fast improvement in the quality of banking and the whole
financial system (De Haas & Van Lelyveld 2002). For example, with the establishment of
a two-tier banking system in 1987, foreign banks were encouraged to enter the Hungarian
market, anticipating that they could improve corporate governance in the financial sector
and contribute to institution building.
2.3.1. Implications on Corporate Governance
Acquired banks are usually subject to strategic reorientation and receive a capital injection
which allows for the upgrading of technologies, know-how, and operational practices. Credit
policies are usually adapted to group-wide and thus international standards. This seems of
particular importance as banks in CEE were burdened with large amounts of bad loans. The
government cleaned the banks’ loan portfolios before or during privatization to make them
more attractive for potential investors.
Foreign owned banks are less involved in connected lending as they need to stick to inter-
national standards and comply with internal group-wide rules which contribute to a reduc-
tion in bad loans (Fink et al. 1998). Foreign ownership creates an incentive to encourage
sound banking practices and a disincentive to damaging speculative short-term financial
flows (Wachtel 2003). Better loan portfolio and risk management can contribute to financial
stability which is important for economic development (King & Levine 1993). In order to
finance public and private investment and expenditure, there is a need for a stable and effi-
cient banking system (Uiboupin 2004, 11). The implementation of sound financial practices
by foreign owned banks may contribute to sound and more stable financial systems. But
what about spillovers to domestic banks?
FDI literature highlights the importance of spillover effects (Uiboupin 2004, 11). Neverthe-
less, know-how and technology transfer within the same branch is seen as a problem (Hunya
2002). It might be less problematic to transfer know-how to other industries which do not
represent competitors of the (foreign) investor. Mutual gains for both industries are rather
possible. In the case of the financial industry, the implementation of stricter credit require-
ments will create the need for companies seeking external finance to adapt to these standards
– mostly international standards. To put it differently, resources might be allocated to more
profitable businesses that themselves stick to international accounting standards, auditing
practices, or sound corporate governance. This is valid for companies seeking external fi-
nance. But over the long run, all industries might be affected which contributes to stable
economic development. Again, a certain initial level of social capabilities and absorptive
capacity of domestic companies as well as infrastructure in support of an improvement in
corporate standards is needed. In that case, a crowding-out effect of investment can be
avoided. Of course, this is not only true for foreign owned banks, but also for domestic
banks adapting their standards to international level in the process of restructuration. The
particular role of the financial sector as an intermediator within an economy will encourage
such spillovers.
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2.3.2. Impact on Institution Building
Further spillovers on the infrastructure including regulation, legislation, or supervision are
also possible (Bonin & Wachtel 2002). As foreign banks enter emerging markets, the intro-
duction of new types of products or services is faster and innovation can even be accelerated
via FSFDI (Wachtel 2001). This creates the need for supervisors to adapt the legal envi-
ronment to these developments. If regulations for new services are not in place or are not
accurately and fast enough adapted, abuse will occur, which will harm the financial sector
and the whole economy (Bonin & Wachtel 2002). Foreign owned banks might even tend
to introduce new products to evade existing legislation, particularly in the case of weak
financial systems (Goldberg 2004, 14). Therefore, local supervisors have to upgrade their
knowledge and further adapt regulations in order to secure financial sector stability. Foreign
owned banks seeking to mitigate their own risk act as a catalyst for regulatory changes and
implementation of international standards (BIS 2004, 14). In this way, foreign owned banks
can contribute to institutional quality which is determined by the absence of corruption, red
tape, or political violence (Faria & Mauro 2004, 3).
2.4. Transmission Channel IV: Signal Effects
Foreign owned banks may strive to gain higher market share through product innovation
and by offering a variety of new financial services, such as asset management services. New
market segments are being developed. Rising national income together with pension reforms
may add to the demand for and implementation of tradeable securities as well for private
investors (BIS 2004, 13). Product innovation and the need of local risk-management to hedge
risks locally foster capital market development. In consequence, corporate investors may
chose from a greater range of finance possibilities which may spur investment and economic
growth. Additional non-financial portfolio investment as well as non-financial FDI might be
drawn in, which in turn influences economic growth (Durham 2003, Reisen & Soto 2001). If
investors that are regarded as rather cautious and risk averse (a usual perception of banks)
enter and invest into a certain market, this initial move may pull in followers from other
industries.
3. Stylized Facts
As Figure 3 shows, foreign penetration in the financial sector has particularly increased
since 1999 and reached a level of more than EUR mn 25,000 or 6.8% of GDP in 2003 in
the respective countries under review3. Interestingly, the inward FSFDI stock as percentage
of GDP reached 11.2% in Estonia averaged from 1996 to 2003, which is an outlying case
not only for this sample, but for entire CEE. Except for Estonia, Figure 4 shows that the
average inward FSFDI stock to GDP ranges between 2.5% and 5% in CEE-10.
3CEE-11: captures all new EU member states from CEE plus the three EU accession countries Bulgaria,
Croatia, and Romania. CEE-10: captures for the inward FSFDI indicator all mentioned countries except
Romania and for the financial M&A indicator all mentioned countries except Croatia.
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Figure 3: Steady Inflow of FSFDI to CEE-10, own calculations based on Hunya & Stankovsky (2005)
and the AMECO database.
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Figure 4: Average FSFDI Stock in CEE-10, 1996–2003; own calculations based on Hunya &
Stankovsky (2005) and the AMECO database.
Figure 5 demonstrates that the financial sector accounts for a quite high share in total
FDI. In 2002 the share of FSFDI in total FDI ranged between 9% in Hungary and 28% in
Estonia. The overall respective average for CEE-10 increased from 17% in 2001 to 19% in
2002. Thus, the “importance” of FSFDI is increasing.
In this context, the question arises whether one can observe already from descriptive data
that FSFDI and economic growth are connected. Figures 6 and 7 show simple scatter plots
and suggest a slight, but positive link between economic growth and FSFDI. Differences in
development among CEE countries are reflected in the broad dispersion of FSFDI inflows.
Particular outliers are Croatia and Latvia, showing a rather high (low) growth in FSFDI,
but at the same time a low (high) growth rate of real GDP per worker averaged over 1996
to 2003. Figure 7 indicates that FSFDI might not only be related positively to GDP on
average, but also concerning annual observations. The latter impact will be tested in the
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Figure 5: Share of FSFDI in Total FDI (Inward Stocks in mn EUR), 2001 and 2002; own calculations
based on Hunya & Stankovsky (2005).
panel data framework. Again, the relatively high dispersion of the data is emphasized by
this graph.
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Trend Growth Rate of the inward FSFDI stock, 1996-2003
Tr
en
d 
G
ro
w
th
 
Ra
te
 
o
f r
ea
l G
DP
 
pe
r 
w
o
rk
er
, 
19
96
-
20
03
HRCZ
HU
SI SK
BG
PL
LT
EE
LV
Figure 6: Economic Growth vs. Growth of FSFDI in CEE-10, averages 1996–2003; own calculations
based on Hunya & Stankovsky (2005) and the AMECO database.
Table 1 as well as Figures 8 and 9 present the second indicator for FSFDI used in this
analysis: completed cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the financial sector.
In absolute terms, Poland has accumulated most of cross border financial M&A from 1994
to 2002, namely EUR mn 8,298. The Czech Republic (5,332 mn), Slovakia (1,219 mn),
and Hungary (1,152 mn) follow. This ranking changes notably when we express the cross
border financial M&A as percentage of GDP, averaged over 1994–2002. The Czech Republic
has been able to attract on average the highest share of financial M&A in terms of national
economic power (96.3%). Estonia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Poland follow with a considerable
high share of over 50%. As a latecomer to bank privatization, Romania turns out to be
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Figure 7: Economic Growth vs. Growth of FSFDI in CEE-10, annual observations 1997–2003; own
calculations based on Hunya & Stankovsky (2005) and the AMECO database.
the country with the lowest respective share: the average accumulation of financial cross
border M&A amounts to only 19% of GDP during the 1994–2002 period. Figure 8 shows
that financial M&A has increased remarkably since 1999. Banks account for the largest
share in financial M&A. Recent trends show a decline in financial M&A activities because
privatization is ending in most CEE countries. According to Breyer (2004), the share of
total bank assets controlled by foreign owners accounted for about 70% in CEE in 2004.
Figure 9 indicates a high dispersion of M&A values over the panel observations. In the
CEECs, financial sector M&A volumes vary considerably over time and across countries
(for 2001 and 2002 see Table 1), leading – at first glance – only to a ambiguous connection
with economic growth. We take this as an indication for the need to include country fixed
effects in the interpretation. Such effects include the timing of banking crises (e. g. Croatia
1998/1999) and following waves of privatization. In Poland, frequent political changes (new
governments about every year) led to a a stop-and-go pattern in bank privatization.
Our novel descriptive data show that FSFDI has a quite high importance for CEE-11,
considering its high share in total FDI. Temporary effects due to changes of FSFDI on growth
of real GDP per worker seem to occur, albeit countries are dispersed to a considerable extent.
While Figure 10 shows that the change of total FDI and economic growth are interrelated
negatively (supporting the findings of Mencinger (2003)), Figure 11 shows that it is promising
to test for a potential hump-shaped relationship between (FS)FDI and economic growth. The
subsequent estimations will render these first stylized facts in a more convincing manner.
Next we attempt to shed light on the evidence of the identified transmission channels as
presented in Section 2 and, thus, guide the subsequent modeling and estimation approach.
The reasoning in setting up the efficiency channel suggests a decreasing interest spread as
response to the entry of foreign banks. This suggestion can be confirmed by the inspection
of Figure 12. The average interest spread had been decreasing from 1994 (13.7%) to 2003
(5.4%). At the same time – and probably also induced by the decreasing interest spreads –
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Table 1: Completed Financial Cross Border M&A in CEE-10, 1994–2002 (own calculations based on
the ECB Baudino et al. (2004) and the AMECO database).
financial cross
border M&A
(%GDP) 2001
financial cross
border M&A
(%GDP) 2002
average financial
cross border
M&A (%GDP)
per year
1994–2002
accumulated
financial cross
border M&A
(mn EUR)
1994–2002
Czech Republic 184.6% 194.0% 96.3% 5332
Estonia 0.0% 0.0% 78.8% 350
Bulgaria 0.0% 51.7% 69.5% 830
Slovakia 477.9% 6.4% 60.3% 1219
Poland 74.6% 15.1% 58.4% 8298
Slovenia 65.5% 278.8% 39.3% 807
Lithuania 66.6% 16.0% 35.4% 379
Latvia 38.0% 0.0% 34.3% 196
Hungary 18.1% 4.4% 30.3% 1152
Romania 6.3% 0.7% 19.0% 628
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Figure 8: Economic Growth and Financial M&A in CEE-10, 1994–2002; own calculations based on
the ECB Baudino et al. (2004) and the AMECO database.
the volume of private credits had been increasing. In general, interest rate margins in CEE
were and still are higher compared to EU-15 financial markets. The reduction in interest
rate margins had been faster in the first period of transition (Drakos 2003).
The last figures of this section account for the credit volume channel and underpin the
role of bad loans, of portfolio cleaning and the better position of foreign banks to withstand
connected lending discussed earlier. While total domestic credit in the CEECs relative to
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Figure 9: Economic Growth vs. Financial M&A (%GDP) in CEE-10; annual observations 1995–2002,
own calculations based on the ECB Baudino et al. (2004) and the AMECO database.
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Figure 10: Negative Connection of Economic Growth and the Change of FDI in CEE-11; own calcu-
lations based on Hunya & Stankovsky (2005) and the AMECO database.
GDP is much lower compared to the Euro area (Breuss, Fink & Haiss 2004), credit to the
public sector still plays a comparatively important role in CEE emerging markets as indicated
by Figure 13. In CEE-11, public credit accounts for a large share of total credit (exceptionally
high in the Czech Republic), whereas in the Euro area, private credit is about three times as
high as credit to the public sector (Naaborg et al. 2003). There exist noteworthy differences
between the various CEECs. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia the volume of
private sector credit to GDP ranged between 40 and 53% whereas in Lithuania, Bulgaria
and Romania the private credit ratio to GDP was less than 16%.
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Figure 11: Hump-Shaped Relationship between Economic Growth and Total FDI in CEE-11; own
calculations based on Hunya & Stankovsky (2005) and the AMECO database.
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
Private credit, EUR mn (left)
[Lending rate - deposit rate] (right)
EU
R
 
m
n
Figure 12: Average Private Credit (EUR mn) and Interest Spread in CEE-11, 1994–2003; own calcu-
lations based on EBRD (2004).
Credit to the private sector has expanded since the beginning of the 90ies – in volume as
well as in relative terms. But, although private credit grew in absolute figures, particularly
in Romania and Lithuania private credit to GDP remained at a relatively low level. As
Figure 14 shows, private credit to GDP stagnated between 6-9% in Romania which might
be the consequence of the late privatisation there.
In Poland, private credit growth remained subdued in 2002/2003 as well as in the first
half of 2004. It evened out at a level of about 30%. The recession in 2001/2002 led to a
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Figure 13: Bank Claims on the Public and the Private Sector as percentage of GDP in CEE-11 and
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Figure 14: Private Credit to GDP in CEE-10, 1998–2003; own calculations based on IFS (Interna-
tional Financial Statistics).
slump in demand for loans and at the same time to an increasing amount of bad loans. In
addition, changing criteria for classifying loan-quality contributed to statistical reduction in
private credit. An increasing amount in bad-loans was another consequence (see Table 2).
The decline in private credit in the Czech Republic from 1994 on does not necessarily
indicate a decline in credit to the private sector. It rather reflects the clearing of risky credit-
portfolios. As a consequence of stricter credit requirements, bad loans were transferred
from commercial banks to state-owned consolidation banks (Reininger, Schardax & Summer
2002). The same development took place in Slovakia. In general, poor conditions in the
banking sector as well as legal enforcement problems, e. g., of creditor rights may have led to
a stagnation in private credit (Naaborg et al. 2003). In contrast, Hungary showed constant
growth in private credit from 1998 on and reached a level of 41% of GDP in 2003.
Banks suffered and still suffer from relatively low loan portfolio quality due to high
amounts of bad loans in all CEE countries. Bad loans, as shown in Table 2 include sub-
standard, doubtful, and loss classification categories for loans, but exclude loans transferred
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Table 2: Bad Loans as percentage of Total Loans in CEE-11, 1998–2003 (own calculations based on
EBRD (2004)).
CZ HU PL SK SI EE LV LT BG RO HR
1998 22.7% 7.9% 11.8% 44.3% 9.5% 4.0% 6.8% 12.5% 11.8% 58.5% 12.6%
1999 24.5% 4.4% 14.9% 32.9% 9.3% 2.9% 6.8% 11.9% 17.5% 35.4% 20.6%
2000 20.4% 3.1% 16.8% 26.2% 9.3% 1.3% 5.0% 10.8% 10.9% 3.8% 19.8%
2001 14.1% 3.0% 20.5% 24.3% 10.0% 1.2% 3.1% 7.4% 7.9% 3.4% 15.0%
2002 8.5% 4.9% 24.7% 11.2% 10.0% 0.8% 2.1% 5.8% 10.4% 2.3% 11.6%
2003 5.0% 3.8% 25.1% 9.1% 9.4% 0.5% 1.5% 2.6% 4.4% 1.6% 9.4%
to a state rehabilitation agency or consolidation bank. The reduction in bad loans has
particularly started since the mid 90ies in most CEE countries.
Most likely because of the recession in 2001/2002, Poland has again experienced an increase
in bad loans since 1999 and had by far the largest amount of bad loans to total loans (25.1%
in 2003). In Slovenia, bad loans remained stable at a 10% level of total loans in the post-1998
period. In contrast, Hungary has experienced a decline in bad loans since 1993. The lowest
share of bad loans in total loans was reached by Estonia (0.5% in 2003). While concentrating
on the efficiency channel in the following, we will keep the relationship between average loan
quality and the FSFDI-driven rising foreign share in lending in mind.
4. Analytical Framework
4.1. Informal Growth Regressions Framework
Choosing a theoretical reference model for the empirical analysis of the impact of FDI on
economic growth, most authors stick to a MRW-type model (Mankiw, Romer & Weil 1992)
and introduce FDI as additional explanatory variable (see, e. g., Campos & Kinoshita 2002,
Mencinger 2003, Neuhaus 2005). This kind of regression is usually characterized by the
inclusion of initial income (in order to test conditional convergence), the investment ratio,
and measures for human capital (see Temple 1999, 123). In addition, several variables of
interest – typically variables concerning political (in)stability, inflation, or the extent of
public sector impact – are built into the regression. Thus, this type of regression is driven in
its specification mainly by previous results in the literature. Since there is a lack of explicit
theoretical derivation of the impact of FDI, this approach can be classified as an “ad-hoc
growth regression” in the tradition of Barro (1991).
Strictly speaking, this “crude” extension of MRW is confronted with remarkable problems
related to measurement and estimation. “Although simple aggregate models are always dubi-
ous, some important insights are neglected in the absence of a formal theoretical derivation”
(Temple 1999, 124). This insight is of particular importance when taking into account that
the variable of interest (FSFDI) could be correlated with initial efficiency (A). A is an
unobserved variable in the MRW-framework and, thus, has to be omitted. Our arguments
raised in Subsection 2.1 support the probability that FSFDI is really correlated with A. As
EI Working Paper No. 69 23
a consequence, its parameter estimates would be biased due to the omitted variable problem
(see Durlauf, Johnson & Temple 2004).
4.2. Cross-Country Growth Accounting
In respect of the deficiencies of the informal growth regression approach, we apply the concept
of cross-country growth accounting, or growth accounting with externalities, respectively,
following in particular Temple (1999, 124 f.) and Badinger (2003, 180 ff.). Cross-country
growth accounting enables the examination of the relative contributions of growth in inputs
and growth in efficiency or technical progress, respectively. The change of output is directly
regressed on the changes in factor inputs. Let us start with the following (augmented)
standard neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale (perfect competition
is assumed):
Y = AKαHβL1−α−β, (4.1)
where Y is the output (GDP), A is technical progress or overall efficiency, respectively, K is
the physical capital, H is the human capital and L is the used labor force. Considering the
constant returns to scale, the intensive form of equation (4.1) can be written as follows:
y = Akαhβ , (4.2)
where y is the output-labor ratio (Y/L), k is the physical capital-labor ratio (K/L) and h
is the human capital-labor (H/L) ratio. Expanding this equation to the cross-section and
time dimension and taking logarithms of both sides and time derivatives we get following
cross-country growth accounting equation:
∆ ln yit = ∆ lnAit + α∆ ln kit + β∆ lnhit, (4.3)
where i = 1, . . . , N (country index), t = 1, . . . , T (time index). The differenced logarithmic
series represents the growth rate in continuous time (∆ ln yit = ∂ln yit∂t =
∂yit/∂t
yit
= y˙ityit ). This
step provides direct estimates of factor shares and there is no term in initial efficiency, which
would be difficult to approximate. This notation allows additionally for the estimation of the
physical capital elasticity (α) and human capital elasticity (β) of the output. In traditional
single country growth accounting these elasticities are usually imposed (see Temple 1999,
124).
How can FSFDI be included into (4.3)? It is a crucial issue to identify the appropriate
input factor through which FSFDI may affect the output. The few theoretical approaches
modeling explicitly economic growth in dependency of FDI detect three possible ways of influ-
ence (see Borensztein et al. 1998, Ruschinski & Sturm 2004). Firstly, FDI is seen as an inflow
of foreign capital affecting the domestic physical capital stock k (either positively via green-
field investments, or also negatively via crowding-out of domestic investment). Secondly, FDI
influences economic growth via knowledge-spillovers which contribute to the development of
local human capital h. Thirdly, FDI spurs economic growth through its positive effects on
overall efficiency A. One can expect that FSFDI works mainly through the A-channel, since
greenfield (de novo) investments play a minor role compared to privatization-related M&A
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(brownfield investment) in the financial sector (Baudino et al. 2004, CGFS 2005, Hainz &
Clayes 2005). We are going to follow primarily this line in modeling the impact of FSFDI.
Nevertheless, the econometric estimations try to consider also the two other effects – inspired
primarily by the findings of Borensztein et al. (1998).
Let us assume, that the change in overall efficiency is determined, ceteris paribus, by
an exogenous component (γA0) and the change in the degree of FSFDI (FSFDI-induced
efficiency). Analogous to Badinger (2003, 181), we can specify the subsequent relationship:
∆ lnAit = γA0 + γA1∆FSFDIit (4.4a)
∆ lnAit = γ
p
A0 + γ
p
A1FSFDIit . (4.4b)
Equation (4.4a) represents temporary efficiency-led growth effects induced by the change
of FSFDI. Since the change of FSFDI affects also its level we can test the hypothesis that
there are even permanent effects on the efficiency growth rate triggered by the change in the
respective level of FSFDI. Thus, substituting (4.4a) and (4.4b) into (4.3) we can distinguish
two central models, which form the base for the empirical estimations in Section 6:
∆ ln yit = γA0 + γA1∆FSFDIit + α∆ ln kit + β∆ lnhit (4.5a)
∆ ln yit = γ
p
A0 + γ
p
A1FSFDIit + α∆ ln kit + β∆ lnhit. (4.5b)
Equation (4.5a) represents the temporary FSFDI-induced efficiency-led growth hypothesis
and equation (4.5b) represents the permanent FSFDI-induced efficiency-led growth hypothe-
sis.
Before applying this analytical framework on the central question of research, we have to
bear in mind potential shortcomings of this approach. Firstly, we require information on the
stocks of physical and human capital. Because of relatively short time series for investment
series, the approximation of the initial values – we are going to start with 1994 – will be
a crucial issue when constructing the data set for the examined CEE countries. Secondly,
while the efficiency channel through which FSFDI affects economic growth can be specified in
this way, other channels as elaborated in Haiss et al. (2005) need to be investigated. Further
work on the theoretical front is obviously warranted.
Additionally, the application of the finance-growth-nexus to the transition economies war-
rants some caution. Due to rather short time series available and difficulties to model
the evolution of output in transition economies, findings on transition economies should be
treated as rather preliminary (Mehl & Winkler 2003). The possible impact of inflation (see
Khan & Senhadji 2000, Rousseau & Wachtel 2002, Valdovinos 2003)), of bad loans and the
possible association of fast credit growth with financial distress (see Cottarelli, Dell’ Ariccia
& Vladkova-Hollar 2005, Kraft & Jankov 2005) are worth mentioning in this context.
5. Empirical Methodology
5.1. Panel Data Regressions
This subsection discusses the econometric particularities of panel data regressions for estimat-
ing the impact of FSFDI on economic growth. We will finally show that a variable-intercept
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panel data model with country- and time-fixed effects is the most appropriate one for our
question of research.
5.1.1. Why Panel Data Regressions?
One of the most important strengths of the panel data approach (PDA) is the combination
of both the time dimension and the cross-section dimension. This combination leads to
more observations, “increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the collinearity among
explanatory variables – hence improving the efficiency of econometric estimates” (Hsiao
2003, 3). Using only time-series models, conversely, would imply to include long lags in
order to prevent short-run fluctuations to drive apparent long-run correlations. This, in
turn, would lead to fewer observations since the cross-section variation is for the most part
ignored (see Temple 1999, 133). Thus, long-run growth effects can be addressed with a higher
degree of confidence using panel data regressions. But we have to consider that panel data
regressions based on annual frequency data, without controlling for time-specific effects, are
often determined by short-run movements or by business cycle fluctuations (see Eller 2004).
As a consequence, it is broadly acknowledged to construct perennial averages or to use annual
data with time-specific dummies in order to capture the likelihood of short-run effects (see
Davoodi & Zou 1998).
Furthermore, the PDA enables to control for omitted variables that are persistent over
time. “By utilizing information on both the inter-temporal dynamics and the individuality
of the entities being investigated, one is able to control in a more natural way for the
effects of missing or unobserved variables” (Hsiao 2003, 5). Unobservable differences that
are systematically related across countries and are fairly constant over time – think about
the characteristics of FSFDI – can be considered within the PDA by the implementation of
country-specific effects. The inclusion of these effects is not only an optional tool in order
to get more information about individual- or time-specific characteristics of the examined
countries, it is also an econometric necessity in order to inhibit correlation between the
regressors purely because of contemporaneous time or country shocks. Ignoring these effects
can lead to parameter heterogeneity in the model specification, what, in turn, “could lead to
inconsistent or meaningless estimates of interesting parameters” (Hsiao 2003, 8).
5.1.2. Dynamic or Static Panel?
The inclusion of lagged dependent variables as regressors helps to control for omitted variable
bias. The ability to lag explanatory variables may also help to control for endogeneity bias.
Along these lines, a dynamic specification of the model can be used to test for Granger
causality or joint determination of the variables (see Nair-Reichert & Weinhold 2001, Hansen
& Rand 2004). Although we recognize these advantages of a dynamic panel model, in this
version of the paper we would like to stick strictly to the theoretical model, which does not
explicitly call for an inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In a future step, when we are
going to employ Granger causalities, we will impose the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable. In this paper we specify the empirical panel data model in a static way. The impact
of lagged values of FSFDI can still be tested.
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5.1.3. Homogeneous or Heterogeneous Coefficients?
Since we are primarily interested in testing whether the behavioral relationship predicting
economic growth is the same across the 11 CEE countries and over the 10 years period,
the slope coefficients of the prediction equation are assumed to not vary neither from one
country to the other nor from one year to the other (see also Baltagi 2001, 47). Assuming
that the slope coefficients are independently distributed, their values can be restricted to
be constant across countries within a given year (for a similar reasoning see Bottasso &
Sembenelli 2001, 173). In this manner, one can still exploit the main advantage of the PDA,
namely high degree of freedoms. Beyond it, we can capture differences across the countries
in differences in the constant term. While the slope coefficients are assumed to be constant,
the intercept is assumed to vary over the cross-section units and absorbs in this way country-
specific, unobservable particularities. These assumptions lead us to the application of the
variable-intercept model (see Hsiao 2003).
Analysis-of-covariance tests help to identify the source of sample variation and to detect
the homogeneity of slope and intercept coefficients among different cross-sectional units at
different times (see Hsiao 2003, 14 ff.). Accordingly, our estimations of the variable-intercept
model are encompassed by covariance tests for intercept homogeneity across cross-sectional
units. The null hypothesis of homogeneous (common) coefficients across the countries is
tested against the alternative hypothesis of a heterogeneous (country-specific) intercept con-
ducting simple F-tests with and without restrictions. A significant F-value indicates country-
specific intercepts.
5.1.4. Fixed or Random Effects?
Once detected country-specific intercepts in the sample, one has to decide whether to treat
them as fixed constants over time (fixed effects) or as random variables (random effects). A
respective assessment is necessary.
One can think about the possibility that FSFDI attempts may induce international ex-
ternal effects. They are difficult to measure, remain persistent over time and vary across
countries. Country-specific effects within the fixed-effect approach can take such externalities
into account. In the variable-intercept model with fixed effects omitted individual-specific
variables are treated as fixed constants over time.
Another argument supports the fixed-effect approach: this examination focuses differences
between specific CEE countries. The situation is not that each country is randomly sampled
from a pool of worldwide countries. The sole interest lies in the mentioned CEE countries
and therefore a panel with random effects does not seem to be appropriate. Against this
background, we have finally given exclusive priority to the fixed-effects estimation procedure.
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6. Estimation
6.1. Empirical Specification and Estimation Procedure
6.1.1. Specification
With respect to the previously discussed methodological requirements, the following static
variable-intercept panel data model with country-fixed and time-fixed effects forms the starting
point for the empirical estimations (see Hsiao 2003):
yi,t = α∗i + β
′xi,t + λt + ui,t, (6.1)
where i = 1, . . . , N (cross-section units), t = 1, . . . , T (time index), yi,t is the dependent vari-
able (economic growth), β′ is a 1×K vector of constants representing the slope coefficients
of the explanatory variables, xi,t is a K × 1 vector of explanatory variables (growth or level
of FSFDI, growth of physical and human capital stock per worker, growth of government
consumption to GDP as control variable), α∗i is a 1 × 1 scalar representing the unobserved
individual-specific effects, and ui,t is the error term representing the effects of those unob-
served variables that vary over i and t; it is assumed to be an independently identically
distributed random variable with mean zero and variance σ2u (uit ∼ IID(0, σ2u))4. Additional
T − 1 dummy variables λt are included, whereby one of the time effects must be dropped to
avoid perfect collinearity (see Greene 2000, 564).
As long as the slope coefficients remain homogeneous and the intercept remains hetero-
geneous over the cross-section units, the subsequent estimations, conducted in EViews 5.0,
follow equation (6.1).
6.1.2. Procedure
The equations of the previous section are estimated in the following way: we start from
a panel data model where all the variables (inclusive intercept) are homogeneous across
the countries and over time. In a first step, F-tests for the heterogeneity of the intercept
are run. We follow the procedure presented in Section 5.1.3 and in the case of significant
country-specific effects, they are treated as fixed ones (remind the reasoning in Section 5.1.4).
Time-fixed effects are included per assumption in each equation because of the likelihood of
short-run business cycle fluctuations (remember the discussion in Section 5.1).
In a second step, the country-specific residuals of the model (at this point a variable-
intercept panel model, given the significant heterogeneous intercept) are examined. Con-
siderable differences in all the standard deviations of the country-specific residuals indicate
group-specific heteroskedasticity. Since heteroskedasticity leads to biased standard errors,
we use White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and covariance to allow for reliable
significance interpretations.
4Given these properties of the noise term, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is the best linear
unbiased estimator (BLUE). Since the observed values for α∗i take the form of dummy variables, this
OLS estimator is called the least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator.
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Finally, all the estimations are accompanied by several sensitivity checks. The robustness
of the estimation results depends on the inclusion of additional variables identified by past
studies as potentially important explanatory variables for growth (see Levine & Renelt 1992,
Sala-i-Martin 1997). Therefore, we are going to check whether the base regressors remain
significant and of the theoretically predicted sign when specific control variables are added.
Among others, it is important to control for fluctuations in the size of the public sector
(see Eller 2004). The ratio of real government consumption to real GDP, both measured in
domestic market prices, covers the impact of the public sector on the real economy. Wages
and salaries are a large component of government consumption, which has been shown to
be unambiguously associated with lower growth (see Barro & Sala-i-Martin 1995). In a
future version of this paper, we attempt to control also for inflation effects. The inclusion
of inflation as conditioning variable may be of special relevance during the early stages of
economic transition, which are usually characterized by high inflation (Rousseau & Wachtel
2002). Mamatzakis, Staikouras & Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2005) and Cottarelli et al. (2005)
thus control for the inflation rate in their investigation of banking concentration and financial
deepening in transition economies (for a similar argument see also Fink, Haiss & Ugljesic
2005).
In addition, overall pure cross-section regressions are run. Outliers are separated from the
model. The various indicators for FSFDI shown in Section 3 are tested and last, but not
least, the time span is varied.
6.2. Estimation Results
The estimation output is summarized in the Output Tables 1–2 (see Appendix B). Using
the inward FSFDI stock per employee or per GDP, respectively (Output Table 1), or using
cross border financial M&A as indicator for FSFDI (Output Table 2) yields more or less the
same results. The standard growth regression variables behave as expected: the change of
physical capital stock per employee is related positively and highly significant to economic
growth. The change of human capital per employee shows in all but one specification the
expected positive sign, albeit not significant. As expected, government consumption to GDP
is related negatively to economic growth, confirming the negative impact of the size of the
public sector on economic growth.
However, the temporary and permanent FSFDI-induced efficiency-led growth hypotheses
cannot be confirmed by direct estimates of the two FSFDI indicators. Although FSFDI
shows the expected positive impact on economic growth, the coefficient is not statistically
significant. Accordingly, more careful handling of the variables is necessary.
The theoretical pros and cons of FSFDI for the host economy (see Section 2) suggest
that there are limits for economic gains from FSFDI. Thus, the optimal degree of FSFDI
lies somewhere in between an extremely high and an extremely low one. One can think
about a hump-shaped relationship between economic growth and FSFDI, which is in part
also suggested by the stylized facts presented in Section 3. In adapting the Stiglitz & Weiss
(1981) argument that foreign banks buy entry by accepting worse lending risks, one could
argue that foreign banks do so once competitive rivalry driven by rising FSFDI surpasses a
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certain threshold. With lags this may be detrimental to GDP growth. As a consequence,
we constructed a transformed index of FSFDI per GDP representing a hump-shaped impact
of FSFDI on economic growth (for details see the data appendix). This index is related
positively to economic growth with a lag of two periods (see regressions 4.5ad, 4.5bc, and
4.5be). While it is highly significant for the estimation employing the financial M&A indica-
tor, it is not significant for the estimations with the inward FSFDI stock indicator (although
it shows a higher t-statistic than the direct estimates for this indicator). Further analy-
sis should strengthen this estimation approach in order to detect potential non-linearities
between (FS)FDI and growth 5.
Borensztein et al. (1998) detected a positive and significant interaction between the stock
of human capital and FDI. They interpret this finding with the observation that “the flow of
advanced technology brought along by FDI can increase the growth rate of the host economy
only by interacting with that country’s absorptive capability”. Following this line of research,
we implement as a second improvement interaction terms between the stock of FSFDI and
the stock of human and physical capital.
We enclose the products of FSFDI and human and physical capital simultaneously in three
different regressions. While the interaction of the FSFDI stock with the index of employees’
education has a positive impact on economic growth, the interaction of the FSFDI stock
with the stock of physical capital is associated negatively to growth. Both effects together
can explain the insignificant impact of FSFDI in the other equations. The specification in
regressions 4.5bb and 4.5bd (financial M&A per employee or to GDP, respectively) replaces
the FSFDI variable by the mentioned interaction terms and yields coefficients that are highly
statistically significant. The high significance of the interaction terms may be the effect of
the omission of other relevant factors, in particular, the FSFDI variable by itself. Therefore
we include FSFDI, human capital, and physical capital individually alongside their product
in regression 4.5ab (change of inward FSFDI stock per employee). In that way, we can test
jointly whether these variables affect growth by themselves or through the interaction term
(see Borensztein et al. 1998). Compared to other equations of Table 1 with the same amount
of total observations, this regression delivers the highest adjusted R2. The two interaction
terms do not change their sign and are still significant, albeit only at the 10% level. FSFDI
by itself enters the equation positively but is still not statistically significant.
Let us try to interpret these findings more accurately. Firstly – considering the positive
human capital-related interaction term – we can detect complementary effects between FSFDI
and human capital on economic growth. FSFDI seems to spur economic growth depending
on a higher human capital stock which is in line with the finding by Borensztein et al. (1998)
that the contribution of FDI to growth holds only when the host country has a minimum
stock of human capital. Knowledge-spillovers to domestic banks associated with the inflow
of FSFDI can be an explanation for this phenomenon. These spillovers can take place if
5For alternative possibilities to estimate a hump-shaped relationship see Crespo-Cuaresma & Silgoner
(2004), who detected a non-linear relationship between inflation and growth in Europe and try to estimate
in particular the thresholds where the inflation rate is correlated negatively or positively, respectively,
with economic growth.
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domestic banks are able to cope with the increasing competition induced by foreign owners.
However, strong evidence on such spillovers has not been found yet (UNECE 2001, 209).
Furthermore, foreign banks seeking to mitigate their own risk might act as a catalyst for
regulatory changes and implementation of international corporate standards. Consequently,
improvements in accounting standards and auditing practices have to follow (BIS 2004, 13).
Such implemented higher standards create the need for adoptions and further human capital
formation of employees in all industries and companies, not only those seeking for external
bank finance. In this context, the particular role of the financial industry within an economy
needs to be considered.
Secondly – considering the negative physical capital-related interaction term – substitu-
tive effects between FSFDI and domestic physical capital on economic growth are indicated.
De Mello (1999) similarly finds that FDI among OECD economies is growth-enhancing only
for countries in which domestic and foreign capital are complements. On the one hand,
FSFDI may have a weaker impact on economic growth in the case of a higher physical
capital stock. On the other hand, the physical capital stock may have a weaker impact on
economic growth in the case of a higher FSFDI stock. The latter effect can be interpreted
by the crowding-out of local physical capital caused by the entry of a foreign bank. Schum-
peterian effects of creative destruction seem to be at work. The first effect, however, which
is probably the stronger one, cannot be interpreted that straightforward. Analogously to
Carkovic & Levine (2002) and Campos & Kinoshita (2002), we could argue that FSFDI is
only growth-enhancing in countries with low physical capital stocks. In any case, respective
analysis deserves more attention. In general, the mode of entry (greenfield vs. M&A), the
kind of business and operation of foreign owners and their target groups (retail vs. wholesale)
has to be considered with regard to the impact on local physical capital formation.
As mentioned before, the panel data estimations have also been encompassed by overall
cross-section regressions. The positive impact of FSFDI on economic growth as suggested by
Figure 6 can be broadly confirmed by the cross-section results, where the trend growth rate
of FSFDI per employee between 1996 and 2003 is related positively and highly significant to
economic growth. Nevertheless, the small sample of 11 CEE countries could lead to small
sample biases and therefore these results have to be interpreted with caution.
Finally, first attempts have been initiated to address potential endogeneity and simultane-
ity problems in the estimation equations. Preliminary general method of moments (GMM)
estimations with instrumental variable techniques (following the procedure as proposed and
discussed by Blundell & Bond (1998), Badinger, Müller & Tondl (2002), Staehr (2003)) con-
firm the aforementioned results. In particular the negative effect of the interaction between
the physical capital stock and FSFDI is still significant, while in a few equations the human
capital-related interaction term is not significant anymore, albeit still positive.
7. Concluding Remarks
Reviewing and combining the finance-growth and the FDI-growth literature, we identify spe-
cial characteristics of foreign owned banks, such as better risk-management techniques, and
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discuss research results on how foreign owned banks have an impact on financial sector de-
velopment. We find some positive but preliminary evidence. We contribute to the literature
by identifying the following possible transmission channels between FSFDI, financial sector
development and economic growth: intermediation / efficiency, intermediation / credit vol-
ume, corporate governance and institution building, as well as signal effects for total FDI
and portfolio investments.
Our empirical results indicate that there can be a positive relationship between FSFDI
and economic development – depending on a careful examination of lagged, hump-shaped or
interacted effects of FSFDI. While we concentrate on one aspect of the relationship between
FSFDI and growth – the efficiency channel – further channels need to be investigated in
the future. Does FSFDI trigger growth in private domestic credit (whereas credit volume
frequently is mentioned as a likely cause for GDP growth in the literature)? Does FSFDI
trigger shrinking interest rate margins (whereas credit price again should have an impact on
investment and growth according to common assumptions)? Does FSFDI also attract FDI
in the real sector or portfolio investment into the host country stock exchange (i. e. are there
spillover effects)?
The above research clearly calls also for a regional broadening. While we concentrated
on “emerging Europe” (i. e. the New EU Member and Candidate Countries from CEE) here,
the model could be replicated for Latin America and South-East Asia which show many
similarities in transition efforts. The true value of the paper lies in modeling hitherto only
qualitatively discussed possible relationships into a structural, econometric model that fol-
lows the standard forward of two streams of related literature.
The connection between FSFDI and economic growth is very sample- and channel-depen-
dent. The investigation of different country samples and different causal linkages appears
to be a fruitful avenue for further research. From an econometric point of view, it is a
promising approach to employ GMM and instrumental variable techniques in order to control
for endogeneity of explanatory variables. In addition, the analysis of Granger causalities for
the variables where the panel results showed a significant relationship shall contribute to a
better interpretation of potential bi-directional interference between FSFDI and economic
growth.
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A. Data Appendix
Growth rates: for the calculation of growth rates we follow Temple (1999, 119) and apply
his trend growth conception. Using only initial and final output for the calculation of the
growth rate may be misleading since either of these may be at some distance from the trend
path of output (due to short-run instabilities, as business cycle fluctuations). Therefore, it
may be preferable to use the least squares growth rate, obtained by regressing the natural
log output series on a constant and a time trend. We use this calculation method for the
pure cross-section regressions and for several interpolations. In regressions based on annual
values we are using the log first-differences for the growth rate.
RGDPL: real GDP at 1995 domestic market prices divided by the number of employed
persons of the total economy. The values for Croatia between 1994 and 1999 are inter-
polated with the trend growth rate between 2000 and 2005. Source: AMECO (annual
macro-economic) database of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic
and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), April 2005.
NGDP: (nominal) GDP at current market prices in mn EUR. Source: AMECO database.
Physical capital stock: real physical capital stock per employee at 1995 domestic market
prices. Time series on the physical capital stock (K) were calculated by using perpetual
inventory methods. The initial capital stock values (K0) were calculated following Easterly
& Levine (2001) by K0/Y0 = (I/Y )φ/gφy+δ, where (I/Y )φ represents annual average investment
rates (gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) of the business sector) over a ten year period,
gφy denotes output growth averaged over a ten year period, and δ is a constant rate of
depreciation assumed to be 0.07. Assuming that the growth rate of the capital stock can be
approximated by the growth rate of GFCF, further values of the capital stock are calculated
by taking the initial value, using annual real changes of GFCF and dividing the values by
the number of employed persons of the total economy. Source: WIIW Research Reports 314,
March 2005; International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF; AMECO database.
Human capital stock: constructed index using reported education levels of employees 1996–
2003 (low educated: ISCED-classification 0-2, weight 1; medium educated: ISCED 3-4,
weight 1.4; high educated: ISCED 5-6, weight 2). Source: EUROSTAT, labour force surveys,
primarily 2nd quarter 1998–2003 (no data for Croatia). Data for 1996–1997 are interpolated
using the trend growth rate between 1998 and 2003. Data for Lithuania are adjusted because
of a structural break 2000–2001 which has given rise to overestimated high educated and
underestimated low educated employees. The EUROSTAT data have been favored respecting
educational attainment rates of the Barro and Lee (2000) database, since the latter one does
not provide sufficient data for the Baltic countries.
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Employment: number of employed persons of the total economy. Source: AMECO database
(national accounts).
GOVGDP: Real final consumption expenditure of the general government to real GDP at
1995 domestic market prices, representing the size of the public sector. Source: AMECO
database.
Exchange rate USD/EUR: USD/EUR (ECU), synthetic USD/EUR exchange rates: using
ECU-basket of 1989; average exchange rate. Calculation for 1980–1998: synthetic Euro,
ECU-weights from 17 September 1989. Source: Bundesbank (2001). Calculation from 1999
on: average rate. Source: IFS, Code “163.RH.ZF”.
FINMA – total financial cross border M&A: flow data relating to completed M&A (mn
EUR) in the financial sector for all eleven CEECs (except Croatia) from 1994 to 2002. The
data exclude corporate transactions involving less than 5% of ownership of banks and non-
bank financial institutions or less than 3% if the transaction value is greater than 1 million
US-$. Although, in practice, all transactions referred to are acquisitions, the acronym M&A
is used. Source: European Central Bank (Baudino et al. 2004).
FSFDI – inward FSFDI stock: financial intermediation (mn EUR) according to NACE-
code J including equity capital, reinvested earnings and loans for all eleven CEECs (except
Romania) from 1996 to 2003. BG: FDI stock for 1999 as given by BNB. The following years
are calculated by adding the EUR inflow of the respective year (in 2000: EUR inflow con-
verted from USD). FSFDI inward stock plus EUR inflows from 2002. HU, SK, HR: Inward
FSFDI stock refers to equity capital and reinvested earnings. LV: for 1992-2000 financial
intermediation includes only equity capital of registered financial institutions. RO: no classi-
fication for financial intermediation available. HR: From 1993–2000 cumulated EUR inflows
of equity capital (USD inflows converted with the average exchange rate into EUR). Source:
Hunya & Stankovsky (2005). Primary source: National Banks according to international
investment position (IIP).
FDIINFL: total FDI inflows (USD) for all eleven CEECs (except Croatia) from 1994 to
2002. Converted into EUR using USD-EUR-1989 basket average exchange rate. Source:
European Central Bank (Baudino et al. 2004).
FDI: total inward FDI stock (mn EUR) including equity capital, reinvested earnings and
loans from 1996 to 2003. Source: Hunya & Stankovsky (2005). Primary source: National
Banks according to international investment position (IIP).
Hump-shaped index for FSDFI: is constructed analogously to Eller (2004): in a country
ranking the lowest and highest values of FSFDI per GDP get a value of one. The next lowest
and highest values get higher values and this procedure is continued up to the medium range
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values of FSFDI per GDP, which get the highest values. This procedure is repeated for each
year within the estimation period.
B. Estimation Output Tables
TABLE 1: PANEL DATA RESULTS FOR THE IMPACT OF FSFDI ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SELECTED CEE COUNTRIES, 1996-2003 
Cross-Country Growth Accounting, Annual Data, Whole Sample 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ln(RGDPLit) 
Temporary Effects Permanent Effects Explanatory 
Variables 
Equations  
(4.5aa) 
FSFDIit = 
∆ln(FSFDIEMPit) 
(4.5ab) 
FSFDIit = 
∆ln(FSFDIEMPit) 
(4.5ac) 
FSFDIit = 
∆ln(FSFDIGDPit) 
(4.5ad) 
FSFDIit = 
∆(FSFDIHUMPi,t-2) 
(4.5ba) 
FSFDIit = 
ln(FSFDIEMPit) 
(4.5bb) 
FSFDIit = 
ln(FSFDIGDPit) 
(4.5bc) 
FSFDIit = 
ln(FSFDIHUMPi,t-2) 
Constant 0.034*** (10.308) 
0.068 
(1.536) 
0.034*** 
(12.193) 
0.037*** 
(12.877) 
0.017 
(0.454) 
0.035 
(1.424) 
0.030*** 
(4.148) 
FSFDIit 
0.0006 
(0.073) 
0.002 
(0.241) 
-0.0012 
(-0.131) 
0.003 
(1.309) 
0.003 
(0.439) 
0.0005 
(0.064) 
0.007 
(1.277) 
∆ln(kit) 0.102*** (4.654) 
0.102*** 
(5.176) 
0.103*** 
(4.675) 
0.115*** 
(3.236) 
0.101*** 
(4.718) 
0.103*** 
(4.722) 
0.075*** 
(2.292) 
∆ln(hit) 0.008 (0.030) 
0.078 
(0.272) 
-0.008 
(-0.007) 
0.049 
(0.231) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.019) 
0.293 
(1.125) 
∆ln(GOVGDPit) -0.123* (-1.808) 
-0.113* 
(-1.733) 
-0.119* 
(-1.765)  
-0.126* 
(-1.895) 
-0.123* 
(-1.849)  
ln(FSFDIit)× ln(hit)  0.005* (1.802)      
ln(FSFDIit)× ln(kit)  -0.003* (-1.859)      
Adj. R² 0.409 0.418 0.409 0.356 0.402 0.400 0.347 
No. of Total Observations 63 63 63 45 64 64 54 
Not Included Countries RO RO RO RO RO RO RO 
F-Value 3.389 3.220 3.391 2.618 3.230 3.215 2.760 
Prob > F 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.013 0.0007 0.0007 0.005 
  Notes: Estimation method: LSDV, static variable-intercept panel data model with country-fixed and time-fixed effects. 
   t-statistics are in parentheses, basing on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White diagonal s.e. & covariance; no d.f. correction). 
   Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%(*), 5%(**), and 1% (***) level, respectively.  
   Time-fixed effects are included per assumption in each equation because of the likelihood of short-run business cycle fluctuations. 
  Source:  For the variable definitions and sources see the data appendix. All regressions are calculated with EViews 5.0. 
 
TABLE 2: PANEL DATA RESULTS FOR THE IMPACT OF FINMA ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SELECTED CEE COUNTRIES, 1996-2002 
Cross-Country Growth Accounting, Annual Data, Whole Sample 
 Dependent Variable: ∆ln(RGDPLit) 
Permanent Effects Explanatory 
Variables 
Equations 
(4.5ba) 
FINMAit = 
ln(FINMAEMPit) 
(4.5bb) 
FINMAit = 
ln(FINMAEMPit) 
(4.5bc) 
FINMAit = 
ln(FINMAGDPit) 
(4.5bd) 
FINMAit = 
ln(FINMAGDPit) 
(4.5be) 
FINMAit = 
ln(FINMAHUMPi,t-2) 
Constant 0.035*** (5.058) 
0.024*** 
(3.304) 
0.023** 
(1.968) 
0.040*** 
(3.119) 
0.023*** 
(6.102) 
FINMAit 
-0.002 
(-0.595)  
-0.002 
(-0.704)  
0.015*** 
(2.799) 
∆ln(kit) 0.125*** (5.299) 
0.113*** 
(4.899) 
0.126*** 
(5.297) 
0.106*** 
(4.415) 
0.109*** 
(6.163) 
∆ln(hit) 0.919 (1.482) 
0.292 
(0.459) 
0.929 
(1.498) 
0.404 
(0.640) 
-0.483 
(-1.240) 
∆ln(GOVGDPit) -0.204*** (-3.530) 
-0.170*** 
(-3.076) 
-0.202*** 
(-3.491) 
-0.171*** 
(-3.009) 
-0.205*** 
(-3.615) 
ln(FINMAit)× ln(hit)  0.007*** (3.443)  
0.006*** 
(2.988)  
ln(FINMAit)× ln(kit)  -0.003*** (-3.597)  
-0.002*** 
(-3.152)  
Adj. R² 0.433 0.418 0.434 0.490 0.492 
No. of Total Observations 45 45 45 45 70 
Not Included Countries HR HR HR HR HR 
F-Value 2.866 3.352 2.874 3.227 4.515 
Prob > F 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.00001 
   Notes: Estimation method: LSDV, static variable-intercept panel data model with country-fixed and time-fixed effects. 
    t-statistics are in parentheses, basing on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White diagonal s.e. & covariance; no d.f. correction).  
    Asterisks indicate variables whose coefficients are significant at the 10%(*), 5%(**), and 1% (***) level, respectively.  
    Time-fixed effects are included per assumption in each equation because of the likelihood of short-run business cycle fluctuations. 
   Source:  For the variable definitions and sources see the data appendix. All regressions are calculated with EViews 5.0. 
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C. Literature Review Tables: The Four Detected Transmission
Channels and the Status Quo of Empirical Analysis
Authors,          
Year of 
publication
Sample 
coverage data
Dependent 
Variables
Explanatory Variables                      
(FS-related)
Explanatory 
Variables                 
(others)
Control 
Variables
Empirical 
methodology Investigated links Major findings Additional results
Bonin,                
Hasan,               
Wachtel                     
(2005) 
Region:
67 banks from 6 
Central and 
Eastern European 
(CEE) countries
Time:
1994-2002
ownership status: 
foreign greenfield; 
domestic de novo;
state-owned; privatized 
bank
Return On Assets (ROA); 
interest margin; commission 
income ratio; cost ratio; non 
interest expenditure ratio; loan 
ratio; deposit ratio; liquid asset 
ratio; equity ratio; loan loss 
provision ratio
- -
stochastic frontier 
analysis to estimate 
bank efficiency; 
regression analysis
transition process 
(privatization) - distinction 
in ownership => impact on 
efficiency
foreign-owned banks are the most cost 
and profit efficient (in particular 
greenfield banks);
state-owned banks the least cost and 
profit efficient
domestic banks have a local advantage in 
fee-for-service business; timing of 
privatization matters for performance
Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Huizinga                    
(2001)
Region:
7900 banks from 
80 countries 
Time:
1988-1995
ownership status: 
foreign vs. domestic; 
emerging vs. 
developed countries
interest margin; non-interest 
income; before tax profits; net 
profit; loan loss provisions; 
overhead costs 
- - regression analysis
foreign banks => impact 
on efficiency of domestic 
banks
in emerging markets: 
foreign banks have higher profits;
increase in foreign bank presence 
leads to decrease in profitability and 
margins of domestic banks
reduction in on-interest income and overall 
expenses of foreign owned  banks lead to 
greater efficiency in the local banking 
system but have a possible crowding-out 
effect
Drakos                       
(2003)
Region: 
283 banks in 11 
CEE countries
Time:
1993-1999
interest margin of 
foreign; state-owned 
and domestic private 
banks
liquidity risk (liquid assets/total 
liabilities); default risk (loan 
loss provisions/loans); interest 
rate risk (net short term 
assets/equity); leverage 
(equity/total assets)
- -
estimations  in the 
context of a 
dealership model
transition process => 
impact on ownership 
status;
foreign bank entry => 
impact on interest margins
foreign banks lead to increased 
competition => positive impact on 
sector efficiency
transition process => decrease in 
interest margins 
low margins are also affected by state-
ownership (state owned banks set narrower 
margins) => not only the efficiency level 
influences interest margins
Eschenbach, 
Francois, 
Schuknecht      
(2000)
Region:
93 countries (no 
specifications)
Time:
1986-1995
interest margin;  
average GDP growth 
per capita; net 
profit/total assets
foreign bank assets; M3/GDP; 
interest margin; private credit;  
reform indicator; non-
performing loans
trade openness; 
bureaucratic quality; 
corruption; general law 
conditions; total value of 
GDP
initial GDP; initial 
human capital; 
population growth
cross-country growth 
regressions
financial sector openness 
=> financial sector 
competition => economic 
growth
positive link between financial sector 
openness - financial sector competition 
and financial sector competition - 
economic growth
-
Eschenbach, 
Francois
(2004)
Region:
130 countries – 
including most of 
the transition 
countries
Time: 
1990 - 1999
interest margin; 
average Gross 
Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth per 
capita
M3/GDP; interest margin; 
private credit; trade protection 
index; gross operating bank 
profit; foreign bank assets; 
financial crisis indicator
trade openness; 
bureaucratic quality; 
dummy variable for 
transition economies; 
corruption; general law 
conditions; total value of 
GDP
population growth; 
inflation
cross-country growth 
regressions
financial sector openness 
=> financial sector 
competition => economic 
growth
strong positive link between financial 
sector openness - financial sector 
competition as well as between 
financial sector competition - economic 
growth confirmed
open financial sectors are more competitive 
and lead to lower financial service prices; 
protection of the financial sector mostly in 
lower income countries
Green,               
Murinde, Nikolov                     
(2004)
Region:
273 banks from 9 
CEE countries
Time: 
1995-1999
foreign vs. domestic 
ownership (dummy 
variable)
interest cost; operating cost; 
output (loans, non-interest 
income, other earning assets)
input prices (labor, capital, 
deposit price) -
augmented translog 
function and two cost 
share equations
foreign banks => impact 
on efficiency of domestic 
banks
cost efficiency (operational efficiency) 
is not always dependent on ownership 
(foreign vs. domestic) 
foreign banks are not more efficient than an 
average domestic bank (in terms of 
economies of scale and scope)
FINANCIAL SECTOR EFFICIENCY - STATUS QUO OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Authors,          
Year of 
publication
Sample 
coverage data
Dependent 
Variables
Explanatory Variables                      
(FS-related)
Explanatory 
Variables                 
(others)
Control 
Variables
Empirical 
methodology Investigated links Major findings Additional results
Koivu
(2004)
Region:
25 transition 
countries (CEE, 
CIS + South 
Eastern Europe)
Time:
1993-2001
real GDP growth interest margin; credit - RI (Reform Indicators) 
and others
fixed-effects panel 
data regression and 
modified Granger 
causality test
efficiency, size of the 
banking sector => 
economic growth;
direction of causality 
between financial sector 
and economic 
development
low interest margins => growth 
enhancing; bank credit with ambiguous 
effects on growth (in case of one year 
lag => neg. effect on growth);     
causality: two-way causality (no exact 
specifications)
increase in reforms in banking sector => 
decrease in interest margins ;
reforms needed before enlargement of the 
banking sector (growth is related to reforms 
and stabilization)
Naaborg,
Scholtens,
De Haan et al
(2003)
Region:
8 CEE countries
Time:
1993-2000
foreign vs. domestic 
ownership (dummy 
variable)
non-interest costs; after-tax 
income; interest margin; ROA; 
private credit/total bank credit
per capita income - simple correlation 
analysis
foreign owned banks => 
profitability
foreign owned banks have higher 
profitability levels than domestic banks
foreign bank presence and financial sector 
development vary considerably among 
countries
Papi,
Revoltella
(2003)
Region:
112 banks from 9 
transition 
economies
Time:
1993-1997
ROA; overhead 
costs/total assets
total assets; net loans/total 
assets; operating income/net 
interest revenue; foreign 
ownership (dummy variable)
- -
regression analysis; 
General Least 
Squares (GLS) 
estimations
FDI in the financial sector 
=> efficiency levels
foreign participation is positively linked 
to profitability
improvements in operating efficiency 
require a foreign majority interest (for cost-
efficiency >70%)
Rossi,
Schwaiger,
Winkler
(2004)
Region:
9 CEE countries
Time:
1995-2002
total costs (operating 
expenses); total profits 
(operating profit minus 
loan loss provisions); 
loans; deposits; other 
earning assets
-
labor; capital; deposits; 
price of labor -
cross-country and 
time series studies
cost and profit efficiency in 
transition economies
general low but increasing level of cost 
and profit efficiency (profit efficiency 
grows stronger, but shows a lower 
present level)
reasons: need for restructuration, 
expanding market share,…; high 
concentration and foreign ownership affect 
cost and profit efficiency
Uiboupin
(2004)
Region:
219 banks from 10 
CEE countries
Time:
1995-2001
private credit to GDP
interest margin; interest 
income/total assets; before tax 
profit; non-interest income; 
total operating expenses; loan 
loss provisions; equity; short-, 
long-term deposits
real GDP growth rate; GDP 
per capita; annual CPI 
change; money market 
interest rate
-
Arellano-Bond 
estimations instead of 
using fixed effects
foreign bank entry => 
impact on performance of 
the banking industry
foreign bank entry increases 
competition; foreign banks raise 
overhead costs of the local banks in the 
short term 
negative impact of foreign bank entry on 
revenues from interest-earning assets, on-
interest income and profitability of domestic 
banks 
Zajc 
(2004)
Region:
6 CEE countries
Time:
1995-2000
interest margin; non-
interest income; before-
tax profit; overhead 
costs; loan loss 
provisions
number, share of foreign 
banks; equity/total assets; non-
earning assets; customer and 
short term funding
country dummies; GDP per 
capita; real GDP growth; 
inflation
-
regression analysis; 
weighted least 
squares method
foreign bank entry => 
impact on performance of 
the banking industry
foreign bank entry enhances 
competition; reduces net interest 
margins, income and profits; increases 
overhead costs of domestic banks
-
FINANCIAL SECTOR EFFICIENCY (CONTINUED) - STATUS QUO OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Authors,          
Year of 
publication
Sample 
coverage 
data
Dependent 
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Explanatory Variables                      
(FS-related)
Explanatory 
Variables                 
(others)
Control 
Variables
Empirical 
methodology Investigated links Major findings Additional results
Baudino,
Caviglia,
Dorrucci et al
(2004)
Region:
12 CEE 
countries
Time:
1993-2002 
monetization; stock 
market capitalization; 
ROA; Return On Equity 
(ROE); private credit; 
credit spreads 
cross-border M&A flows; 
foreign bank assets FDI stocks; FDI flows - descriptive analysis
foreign bank entry  
=> stability in lending 
practices
foreign banks mostly involved in retail 
business;
FSFDI is robust to local business 
cycles 
low risk of less stable credit provision by 
foreign banks;
comparatively stable financial environment
Cottarelli,
Dell'Ariccia,
Vladkova-Hollar
(2005)
Region:
24 CEE and 
Baltic countries
Time:
1973-1996
GDP per capita;
bank entry restrictions; legal 
origin; cumulative growth of 
private credit
public debt ratio; inflation 
rate; liberalization index; 
accounting
-
panel data 
regressions credit growth
higher financial deepening is correlated 
to GDP per capita; speed in financial 
deepening does not seem abnormal in 
the countries under study
more transparent countries have deeper 
banking systems
De Haas,
Van Lelyveld
(2002)
Region:
5 CEE 
countries
Time:
1993-2000
GDP growth
domestic credit; foreign 
subsidiaries credit; cross-
border credit 
- -
simple correlation 
analysis
foreign bank credit 
=> volatility of credit supply 
compared to domestic 
credit
increase in foreign bank credit relative 
to GDP as well as relative to domestic 
credit
temporary reduction in cross-border credit 
was offset by increases in local subsidiary's 
credit
Engerer,
Schrooten 
(2004)
Region:
8 CEE 
countries
Time:
1995 - 2002
foreign bank assets; 
interest margin; private 
credit; reform indicator; 
non-performing loans
trade openness; bureaucratic 
quality; corruption; general 
law conditions; GDP growth
initial GDP; initial human 
capital; population growth -
simple correlation 
analysis
foreign bank entry 
=> financial intermediation
ambiguous impact on financial depth 
and the importance of credit to the 
private sector; heterogeneity among 
CEE financial sectors
foreign banks help the improvement of 
financial intermediation and reduction in 
bad loans; foreign banks play a role in 
institutional development 
Giannetti,
Ongena
(2005)
Region: 
14 CEE 
countries
Time: 
1993-2002
firm sales; assets; 
debt/assets; trade 
credit/sales; number of 
firms
foreign bank lending; total 
blank lending/GDP 
financial loans/total 
liabilities; sectoral 
employment; firm 
employees; dummy 
variables for the time when 
firm started to operate
institutional variable; 
legal framework 
variable; business 
cycle effects
panel data 
regressions
foreign bank lending 
=> firm growth
firm growth in sales, assets and 
leverage stimulated by foreign lending; 
improvement in capital allocation; 
mitigation of connected lending 
problems by foreign owned banks
allocational efficiency improved by foreign 
lending; foreign bank entry affects industrial 
structure; SMEs benefit to a lesser extent 
from foreign bank lending
Mehl,
Winkler
(2003)
Region: 
8 Southeast 
European 
countries
Time:  
1993-2001
real GDP growth per 
capita
private credit; broad 
money/GDP
share of private 
sector/GDP; degree of 
transition 
war; initial human 
capital; inflation; initial 
GDP per capita
OLS, 2SLS and 
country fixed effect 
analysis
financial depth 
=> economic growth
no significant growth enhancing effect 
of financial depth; significant growth 
effect of degree of transition and 
inflation
no significance of initial human capital and 
initial GDP per capita; foreign banks 
contributed to the increase in monetization 
(stabilizing influence)
Khan,
Senhadji
(2000)
Region:         
159 industrial 
and developing 
countries
Time:          
1960-1999
real GDP growth per 
capita; investment/GDP
domestic credit; domestic 
credit and stock market 
capitalization; private and 
public bond market and 
stock market capitalization
population growth; trade 
growth rate log initial income
cross-country and 
time-series 
regressions
financial depth 
=> economic growth
strong positive and significant 
relationship between financial depth 
and economic growth in cross-country 
estimations; introducing the time-
dimension shows weaker results
non-linear relationship between financial 
depth and economic growth; high sensitivity 
to variables of financial depth
Naaborg,
Scholtens, 
De Haan et al
(2003)
Region:         
8 CEE 
countries
Time:              
1993-2000
foreign vs. domestic 
ownership (dummy 
variable)
non-interest costs; after-tax 
income; interest margin; 
ROA; private credit/total 
bank credit
per capita income - simple correlation 
analysis
foreign owned banks 
=> credit supply
private credit remained at a relatively 
low level but rose slightly 
foreign owned banks took over the role as 
creditors; public credit exceeded private 
credit
Sabi
(1996)
Region:       
33 banks in 
Hungary   
Time:         
1992-1993
foreign vs. domestic 
ownership (dummy 
variable)
profitability: ROA; ROE; 
operating profit ratio; interest 
margins; liquidity and credit 
risk: loan deposit ratio; long 
term loans/total loans; 
security/total assets
- -
student's t and Kruskal-
Wallis tests
foreign bank performance 
in Hungary
foreign banks are more profitable, not 
exposed to high liquidity or credit risk 
reason: at the beginning of transition 
foreign banks were mostly involved in 
wholesale banking, they operated branches 
in the host markets
FINANCIAL SECTOR INTERMEDIATION - STATUS QUO OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Authors,          
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publication
Sample 
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Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt,
Levine
(2003)
Region:  
115 industrial, 
developing 
countries
Time:  
1990-1995
stock market 
development; 
protection of property 
rights; private credit
financial intermediary
legal origin; tenure of 
supreme court judges; 
common vs. case law; 
supreme court power; 
legal justification; 
independence
-
cross-country 
regressions and 
historical 
comparisons
differences in legal origin 
=> cross-country 
differences in financial 
development
legal origin matters for financial 
development; legal traditions differ in 
their ability to adapt  to evolving 
economic conditions
legal systems adaptability as exogenous 
component  explains cross-country 
differences in financial intermediary 
development
Beck,
Levine,
Loayza,
(2000)
Region:     
74 countries
Time:  
1960-1995
real GDP growth
commercial bank 
assets/total assets; liquid 
liabilities/GDP; private credit
- legal origin; income 
cross-section and 
panel-data (GMM 
estimators) 
regression analysis
differences in financial 
development => GDP 
growth
exogenous components of financial 
intermediary development are 
positively associated with economic 
growth
legal and accounting reforms can boost 
financial development and economic 
growth
Bol,
Lensink, 
De Haan 
(2002)
Region: 
8 CEE 
countries
Time: 
1992-2000
number of foreign 
banks; foreign bank 
assets
reform in banking; interest 
rate liberalization; transition 
of trade and foreign 
exchange system; private 
credit; M2/GDP
share in private 
sector/public sector; 
degree of civil, political 
rights, of democracy; 
reform indicator; political 
freedom indicator; GDP; 
investment rate
inflation; wealth 
indicator; population
principal components 
analysis
foreign bank entry => 
importance of reforms and 
political freedom
foreign bank entry positively responds 
to reform measures; some evidence 
for political freedom could be found
reforms affecting financial sector effciency, 
the structure of the financial sector and 
domestic investment attract FSFDI
Falcetti,
Lysenko,
Sanfey
(2005)
Region: 
25 transition
countries 
Time:
1989-2003
real GDP growth -
average of eight EBRD 
transition indicators; 
general government 
balance relative to GDP
initial conditions 
index; country 
dummy variables to 
capture fixed effects
single and 
simultaneous 
equation specification
reforms => economic 
growth (including a lag)
robust, positive influence of reforms in 
one period on subsequent growth
higher growth is associated with further 
reform efforts; fiscal discipline, catch-up, 
initial conditions, trade links and oil prices 
influence a country's growth performance
Faria,
Mauro
(2004)
Region: 
55 emerging 
market 
economies 
Time:
2001
total equity; FDI; 
portfolio equity; 
portfolio debt; other 
liabilities
-
institutional quality index; 
GDP/capita; primary, 
secondary school 
attainment 
natural resources; 
openness; English 
legal origin; transition 
cross-country growth 
regressions
institutional quality => FDI, 
portfolio investment
institutional quality is significantly, 
positively associated with FDI, portfolio 
equity and total equity
natural resources and human capital are 
pull-factors for FDI
Mehl,
Vespro,
Winkler
(2005)
Region:
7 South 
Eeastern 
European 
(SEE) 
countries
Time:
1993-2003
GDP per capita growth
EBRD index of banking 
sector reform; EBRD 
transition indicators; number 
of foreign banks; private 
credit/GDP; creditor rights 
index; broad money/GDP 
(monetization)
government 
expenditure/GDP;  
inflation; openness
time dummies; 
accession dummy; 
initial human capital; 
initial GDP per capita;  
panel data 
regressions (no 
inclusion of fixed 
effects)
legal environment; 
financial deepening; 
foreign banks => 
economic growth
sound legal environment (higher 
creditor right protection together with 
higher macroeconomic stability) 
contributes positively to economic 
growth;
foreign bank entry positively 
contributes to economic growth, too
only weak evidence of a positive link 
between financial deepening and 
economic growth; too short time series, 
possible ill-suited standard growth 
regression framework and higher 
importance of quality are possible 
explanations
INSTITUTION BUILDING - STATUS QUO OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Authors,          
Year of 
publication
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coverage 
data
Dependent 
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Explanatory Variables                      
(FS-related)
Explanatory 
Variables                 
(others)
Control 
Variables
Empirical 
methodology Investigated links Major findings Additional results
Buch 
(2002)
Region: 
Bank for 
International 
Settlement 
(BIS) reporting 
countries 
Time: 
1997
cross-border bank 
claims/GDP; cross-
border bank 
assets/total external 
debt (bank lending + 
bond finance)
restrictions in banking; 
distance; controls on cross-
border financial credits
EU-membership (dummy 
variable); common legal 
system; common language
-
cross-country 
regressions
determinants of cross-
border bank asset holdings
increase of cross-border banking 
assets and bond finance with higher 
level of economic development; 
decrease of cross-border lending with 
economic development, with distance 
and EU-membership
no homogeneity across countries of 
determinants of cross-border asset 
holdings; no significant impact of common 
legal system and language on the structure 
of debt
Buch, 
De Long 
(2004)
Region: 
138 OECD 
country pairs 
Time: 
1995-2000
number of cross-border 
bank mergers
information costs; index of 
capital controls
language; law; regulations; 
government ownership
ROA; size of the 
biggest banks; 
domestic credit/GDP; 
density of population; 
GDP 
tobit regression 
analysis
international bank mergers 
=> identification of pull  
factors
information costs (proxied by distance 
and common cultural factors) impede 
cross-border bank mergers; regulations 
have an influence as well 
reduction in information costs possible 
though advancements in technology that 
promote travel and communication
Demekas, 
Balázs, 
Ribakova
Wu
(2005)
Region: 
15 SEE 
countries 
Time: 
2000-2002
FDI flows; FDI stock -
distance between host and 
source; log GDP; cultural 
ties; foreign exchange and 
trade liberalization; tariff 
revenue; corporate income 
tax; infrastructure reform; 
corruption
-
bilateral cross-section 
regressions
FDI => identification of pull  
factors
high unit labor costs, high corporate tax 
burden and high level of import tariffs 
discourage FDI
tax holidays and domestic corruption are 
less important 
Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Maksimovic 
(2002)
Region: 
40 countries 
Time: 
1989-1996
GDP/capita;  turnover; 
bank/GDP; market; 
return on assets; net 
sales/net fixed assets
long-term capital; proportions 
of companies passing certain 
growth levels 
total assets/GDP; net fixed 
assets/total assets
law and order 
indicator, commonlaw 
dummy; creditor rights 
index; shareholder 
rights index
-
bank-, market-based 
financial systems => 
impact on firm growth
development of a country’s legal 
system predicts access to external 
finance
both systems affect financing in different 
ways, especially at lower levels of financial 
development
Vanassche 
(2004)
Region:  
45 countries 
(27 industries) 
Time: 
1980-1997
industry growth rates of 
real value added
private credit; stock market 
capitalization; liquid liabilities
trade openness; maturity of 
firms   
human capital; rule of 
law
cross-country 
regressions
financial openness => 
industry growth
financial integration enhances growth in 
any industry as well as domestic 
financial sector development
industries in need of external finance grow 
faster in open economies
FINANCIAL SECTOR SIGNAL EFFECTS - STATUS QUO OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
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Variables                 
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Durham  
(2003)
Region: 
88 low and high 
income 
countries 
Time:        
1977-2001; 
1982-2000
GDP growth
FDI; Bond Foreign Portfolio 
Investment (BFPI);  Other 
Foreign Investment (OFI)
level of financial, legal 
development; secondary 
schooling; investment ratio
initial level of real per 
capita income; 
population growth; 
average total 
investment/GDP
cross-section 
regressions
FDI, OFI, BFPI => impact 
on economic growth and 
volatility of business cycles
Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), 
BFPI, OFI => no significant impact on 
growth; 
OFI has positive effect in countries with 
larger equity markets and few 
corruption;
only OFI affects macroeconomic 
volatility
FDI and EFPI more helpful in promoting 
growth;
several factors (e.g. initial conditions) 
important for growth effects
Durham 
(2004)
Region: 
80 countries 
(low and high 
income 
countries) 
Time:
1979-1998
GDP growth FDI; EFPI; stock market 
capitalization
trade/GDP; male education 
rate; business regulation 
index; property rights 
index; corruption index
initial real per capita 
income; average total 
investment/GDP; 
population growth
cross section 
regressions including 
robustness checks 
(extreme bound 
analysis)
FDI, EFPI => impact on 
economic growth 
lagged FDI, EFPI => no direct, 
unmitigated positive effect on economic 
growth
level of financial and institutional 
development determinant for the impact on 
growth
Fink, 
Haiss, 
Vukšić
(2004)
Region: 
9 CEE, 18 
developed 
countries 
Time: 
1991, 1996-
2000
real output growth per 
capita
domestic, private credit; 
stock market capitalization; 
bonds outstanding
capital stock growth; labor 
participation; educational 
attainment
-
panel-data and cross-
section estimations
sources of external finance 
=> economic growth
growth enhancing effect of bond 
markets; no significant growth 
enhancing effect of stock markets; 
higher growth enhancing effect of 
domestic than private credit
transfer mechanisms differ over the 
development cycle of an economy; FDI and 
portfolio investment help to raise capital 
accumulation
Fink,
Haiss,
Hristoforova
(2003)
Region:
13 developed 
countries
Time:
1950-2000
GDP growth bond market capitalization - -
causality tests 
following Engel and 
Granger (1987)
bond markets in developed 
countries <=> economic 
growth
findings in support of a supply-leading 
role of the financial sector in USA, UK, 
CH, GER, AUT, NL, E; 
interdependence in JPN, FIN and IT
stationary, co-integration, and causality 
features of the variables are taken into 
account
Krkoska 
(2001)
Region:  
25 transition 
countries  
Time:    
1998 - 2000
gross fixed capital 
formation
FDI; foreign credit; domestic 
credit; state subsidies; 
capital market financing; real 
interest rate; stock market 
liquidity
privatization revenues; 
accession dummy; natural 
resources dummy; EBRD 
transition indicator
-
linear approach of the 
two functions (SUR 
estimations)
FDI vs. other forms of 
financing => gross fixed 
capital formation
FDI, an increase in capital market 
capitalization and availability of 
domestic credit => positive correlation 
to gross fixed capital formation
FDI is the largest source of external 
enterprise financing; capital accumulation is 
promoted by international capital flows;         
gross fixed capital formation drives 
economic growth
Reisen, 
Soto 
(2001)
Region: 
44 OECD non-
member states 
and Turkey 
Time: 
1986-1997
real GDP growth per 
capita
FDI; portfolio equity; bond 
flows
lagged GDP; squared 
national savings; 
government consumption; 
log (terms of trade)
- regression analysis
broad categories of net 
capital inflows => their 
independent impact on 
economic growth
most important growth impact by 
portfolio equity inflows; followed by FDI 
showing low reversibility; contribution to 
growth by foreign bank lending only in a 
well-capitalized banking system; no 
significant growth impact of bonds and 
official flows
developing countries should encourage 
portfolio equity inflows and FDI to stimulate 
long-term growth 
SOURCES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - STATUS QUO OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
EI Working Papers 
1 Gerhard Fink, A Schedule of Hope for the New Europe, Oktober 1993. 
2 Gerhard Fink, Jutta Gumpold, Österreichische Beihilfen im europäischen 
Wirtschaftsraum (EWR), Oktober 1993. 
3 Gerhard Fink, Microeconomic Issues of Integration, November 1993. 
4 Fritz Breuss, Herausforderungen für die österreichische Wirtschaftspolitik und die 
Sozialpartnerschaft in der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, November 1993. 
5 Gerhard Fink, Alexander Petsche, Central European Economic Policy Issues,  
July 1994. 
6 Gerhard Fink, Alexander Petsche, Antidumping in Österreich vor und nach der 
Ostöffnung, November 1994. 
7 Fritz Breuss, Karl Steininger, Reducing the Greenhouse Effect in Austria: A 
General Equilibrium Evaluation of CO2-Policy-Options, March 1995. 
8 Franz-Lothar Altmann, Wladimir Andreff, Gerhard Fink, Future Expansion of the 
European Union in Central Europe, April 1995. 
9 Gabriele Tondl, Can EU's Cohesion Policy Achieve Convergence?, April 1995. 
10 Jutta Gumpold, Nationale bzw. gesamtwirtschaftliche Effekte von Beihilfen - 
insbesondere Exportbeihilfen, April 1995. 
11 Gerhard Fink, Martin Oppitz, Kostensenkungspotentiale der Wiener Wirtschaft - 
Skalenerträge und Kostendruck, August 1995. 
12 Alexander Petsche, Die Verfassung Ungarns im Lichte eines EU-Beitritts, 
September 1995. 
13 Michael Sikora, Die Europäische Union im Internet, September 1995. 
14 Fritz Breuss, Jean Tesche, A General Equilibrium Analysis of East-West 
Migration: The Case of Austria-Hungary, January 1996. 
15 Alexander Petsche, Integrationsentwicklung und Europaabkommen EU - Ungarn, 
Juli 1996. 
16 Jutta Gumpold, Die Ausfuhrförderung in der EU, Juni 1996. 
17 Jutta Gumpold, Internationale Rahmenregelungen zur Ausfuhrförderung,  
Juni 1996. 
18 Fritz Breuss, Austria's Approach towards the European Union, April 1996. 
19 Gabriele Tondl, Neue Impulse für die österreichische Regionalpolitik durch die 
EU-Strukturfonds, Mai 1996. 
20 Griller, Droutsas, Falkner, Forgó, Klatzer, Mayer, Nentwich, Regierungskonferenz 
1996: Ausgangspositionen, Juni 1996. 
21 Stefan Griller, Ein Staat ohne Volk? Zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union, Oktober 
1996. 
22 Michael Sikora, Der „EU-Info-Broker“ – ein datenbankgestütztes Europa-
informationssystem im World Wide Web über die KMU-Förderprogramme der 
Europäischen Kommission, November 1996. 
23 Katrin Forgó, Differenzierte Integration, November 1996. 
24 Alexander Petsche, Die Kosten eines Beitritts Ungarns zur Europäischen Union, 
Januar 1997. 
25 Stefan Griller, Dimitri Droutsas, Gerda Falkner, Katrin Forgó, Michael Nentwich, 
Regierungskonferenz 1996: Der Vertragsentwurf der irischen Präsidentschaft, 
Januar 1997. 
26 Dimitri Droutsas, Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der 
Europäischen Union. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Neutralität 
Österreichs, Juli 1997. 
27 Griller, Droutsas, Falkner, Forgó, Nentwich, Regierungskonferenz 1996: Der 
Vertrag von Amsterdam in der Fassung des Gipfels vom Juni 1997, Juli 1997. 
28 Michael Nentwich, Gerda Falkner, The Treaty of Amsterdam. Towards a New 
Institutional Balance, September 1997. 
29 Fritz Breuss, Sustainability of the Fiscal Criteria in Stage III of the EMU,  
August 1998. 
30  Gabriele Tondl, What determined the uneven growth of Europe´s Southern 
regions? An empirical study with panel data, März 1999. 
31 Gerhard Fink, New Protectionism in Central Europe - Exchange Rate Adjustment, 
Customs Tariffs and Non-Tariff Measures, Mai 1999. 
32 Gerhard Fink, Peter Haiss, Central European Financial Markets from an EU 
Perspective. Review of the Commission (1998) Progress Report on Enlargement, 
Juni 1999. 
33 Fritz Breuss, Costs and Benefits of EU Enlargement in Model Simulations,  
Juni 1999. 
34 Gerhard Fink, Peter R. Haiss, Central European Financial Markets from an EU 
Perspective. Theoretical aspects and statistical analyses, August 1999. 
35 Fritz Breuss, Mikulas Luptacik, Bernhard Mahlberg, How far away are the CEECs 
from the EU economic standards? A Data Envelopement Analysis of the economic 
performance of the CEECs, Oktober 2000. 
36 Katrin Forgó, Die Internationale Energieagentur. Grundlagen und aktuelle Fragen, 
Dezember 2000 
37 Harald Badinger, The Demand for International Reserves in the Eurosystem, 
Implications of the Changeover to the Third Stage of EMU, Dezember 2000. 
38 Harald Badinger, Fritz Breuss, Bernhard Mahlberg, Welfare Implications of the 
EU’s Common Organsiation of the Market in Bananas for EU Member States, 
April 2001 
39 Fritz Breuss, WTO Dispute Settlement from an Economic Perspective – More 
Failure than Success, Oktober 2001. 
40 Harald Badinger, Growth Effects of Economic Integration – The Case of the EU 
Member States,  Dezember 2001. 
41 Gerhard Fink, Wolfgang Koller, Die Kreditwürdigkeit von Unternehmen im 
Hinblick auf die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion - Wien im österreichischen 
Vergleich, Dezember 2001. 
 
42 Harald Badinger, Gabriele Tondl, Trade, Human Capital and Innovation: The 
Engines of European Regional Growth in the 1990s, Januar 2002. 
43 David Blum, Klaus Federmair, Gerhard Fink, Peter Haiss, The Financial-Real 
Sector Nexus: Theory and Empirical Evidence, September 2002. 
44 Harald Badinger, Barbara Dutzler, Excess Reserves in the Eurosystem: An 
Economic and Legal Analysis, September 2002. 
45 Gerhard Fink, Nigel Holden, Collective Culture Shock: Constrastive Reactions to 
Radical Systemic Change, Oktober 2002. 
46 Harald Badinger, Fritz Breuss, Do small countries of a trade bloc gain more of its 
enlargement? An empirical test of the Casella effect for the case of the European 
Community, Oktober 2002. 
47 Harald Badinger, Werner Müller, Gabriele Tondl, Regional convergence in the 
European Union (1985-1999). A spatial dynamic panel analysis, Oktober 2002. 
48 Harald Badinger, Fritz Breuss, What Has Determined the Rapid Post-War Growth 
of Intra-EU Trade?, February 2003. 
49 Gerhard Fink, Peter Haiss, Sirma Hristoforova, Bonds Market and Economic 
Growth, April 2003. 
50 Fritz Breuss, Markus Eller, Efficiency and Federalism in the European Union, The 
Optimal Assignment of Policy Tasks to Different Levels of Government, May 
2003. 
51 Gabriele Tondl, Goran Vuksic, What makes regions in Eastern Europe catching 
up? The role of foreign investment, human resources and geography, May 2003. 
52 Fritz Breuss, Balassa-Samuelson Effects in the CEEC: Are they Obstacles for 
Joining the EMU?, May 2003. 
53 Angelika Hable, Handlungsformen und Kompetenzen in der Europäischen 
Verfassungsdebatte, September 2003. 
54 Heinrich Schneider, „Kerneuropa“ Ein aktuelles Schlagwort und seine Bedeutung, 
Februar 2004. 
55 Harald Badinger, Do we really know that the EU’s Single Market Programme has 
fostered competition? Testing for a decrease in markup ratios in EU industries, 
February 2004. 
56 Michaela Seifert, Die Rechtlichen Grundlagen des Bologna-Prozesses und der 
Lissabon-Strategie – europaweite Vereinheitlichung der Studienstrukturen und 
Maßnahmen zur Erleichterung der Anerkennung von Diplomen, März 2004. 
57 Heinrich Schneider, Liquidiert Präsident Bush das Völkerrecht? Macht, Recht und 
Europa in der heutigen Weltordnungspolitik, April 2004. 
58 Gerhard Fink, Peter Haiss, Goran Vukšić, Changing Importance of Financial 
Sectors for Growth from Transition to Cohesion and European Integration, July 
2004. 
59 Gabriele Tondl, EU Regional Policy. Experiences and Future Concerns, July 2004. 
60 Gerhard Fink, Anne-Katrin Neyer, Marcus Kölling, Sylvia Meierewert, An 
Integrative Model of Multinational Team Performance, November 2004. 
61 Kathrin Blanck, Flexible Integration in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
December 2004. 
62 Gerhard Fink, Marcus Kölling, Anne-Katrin Neyer, The Cultural Standard 
Method, January 2005. 
63  Peter Haiss, Stefan Marin, Options for Developing Bond Markets – Lessons from 
Asia for Central and Eastern Europe, January 2005. 
64  Gerhard Fink, Peter Haiss, Hans Christian Mantler, The Finance-Growth Nexus: 
Market Economies vs. Transition Countries, February 2005 
65  Fritz Breuss, Austria, Finland and Sweden after 10 Years in the EU: Expected and 
Achieved Integration Effects, March 2005. 
66  Harald Badinger, Fritz Breuss, Trade and Productivity: An Industry Perspective, 
March 2005. 
67  Angelika Hable, The European Constitution: Changes in the Reform of 
Competences with a Particular Focus on the External Dimension, March 2005. 
68  Gerhard Fink, Peter Haiss, Herwig Kirchner, Ulrike Thorwartl: Financing trough 
Bond Issues and the Nexus with Economic Growth, September 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Europe Institute Publication Series 
(available via bookstores) 
1 Österreichisches Wirtschaftsrecht und das Recht der EG. Hrsg von Karl 
Korinek/Heinz Peter Rill. Wien 1990, Verlag Orac. XXIV und 416 Seiten. (öS 
1.290,-) 
2 Österreichisches Arbeitsrecht und das Recht der EG. Hrsg von Ulrich Runggaldier. 
Wien 1990, Verlag Orac. XIII und 492 Seiten. (öS 1.290,-) 
3 Europäische Integration aus österreichischer Sicht. Wirtschafts-, sozial und 
rechtswissenschaftliche Aspekte. Hrsg von Stefan Griller/Eva Lavric/Reinhard 
Neck. Wien 1991, Verlag Orac. XXIX und 477 Seiten. (öS 796,-) 
4 Europäischer Binnenmarkt und österreichisches Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht. Hrsg 
von Heinz Peter Rill/Stefan Griller. Wien 1991, Verlag Orac. XXIX und 455 
Seiten. (öS 760,-) 
5 Binnenmarkteffekte. Stand und Defizite der österreichischen Integrations-
forschung. Von Stefan Griller/Alexander Egger/Martina Huber/Gabriele Tondl. 
Wien 1991, Verlag Orac. XXII und 477 Seiten. (öS 796,-) 
6 Nationale Vermarktungsregelungen und freier Warenverkehr. Untersuchung der 
Art. 30, 36 EWG-Vertrag mit einem Vergleich zu den Art. 13, 20 
Freihandelsabkommen EWG - Österreich. Von Florian Gibitz. Wien 1991, Verlag 
Orac. XIV und 333 Seiten. (öS 550,) 
7 Banken im Binnenmarkt. Hrsg von Stefan Griller. Wien 1992, Service Fachverlag. 
XLII und 1634 Seiten. (öS 1.680,-) 
8 Auf dem Weg zur europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion? Das Für und 
Wider der Vereinbarungen von Maastricht. Hrsg von Stefan Griller. Wien 1993, 
Service Fachverlag. XVII und 269 Seiten. (öS 440,-) 
9 Die Kulturpolitik der EG. Welche Spielräume bleiben für die nationale, 
insbesondere die österreichische Kulturpolitik? Von Stefan Griller. Wien 1995, 
Service Fachverlag. 
10 Das Lebensmittelrecht der Europäischen Union. Entstehung, Rechtsprechung, 
Sekundärrecht, nationale Handlungsspielräume. Von Michael Nentwich. Wien 
1994, Service Fachverlag. XII und 403 Seiten. (öS 593,-) 
11 Privatrechtsverhältnisse und EU-Recht. Die horizontale Wirkung nicht 
umgesetzten EU-Rechts. Von Andreas Zahradnik. Wien 1995, Service Fachverlag. 
(öS 345,-) 
12 The World Economy after the Uruguay Round. Hrsg von Fritz Breuss. Wien 1995, 
Service Fachverlag. XVII und 415 Seiten. (öS 540,-) 
13 European Union: Democratic Perspectives after 1996. Von Gerda Falkner/ 
Michael Nentwich. Wien 1995, Service Fachverlag. XII und 153 Seiten. (öS 385,-) 
14 Rechtsfragen der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Hrsg von Heinz Peter Rill und 
Stefan Griller. Wien 1997, Springer Verlag Wien/New York, 197 Seiten. 
15 The Treaty of Amsterdam – Facts Analysis, Prospects. Von Stefan Griller, Dimitri 
P. Droutsas, Gerda Falkner, Katrin Forgó, Michael Nentwich. Wien 2000, 
Springer Verlag Wien/New York, 643 Seiten. 
16 Europäisches Umweltzeichen und Welthandel. Grundlagen, Entscheidungs-
prozesse, rechtliche Fragen. Von Katrin Forgó. Wien 1999, Springer Verlag 
Wien/New York 1999, 312 Seiten. 
17  Interkulturelles Management. Österreichische Perspektiven. Von Gerhard Fink, 
Sylvia Meierewert (Hrsg.), Springer Verlag Wien/New York, 2001, 346 Seiten 
18  Staatshaftung wegen Gemeinschaftsrechtsverletzung: Anspruchsgrundlage und 
materielle Voraussetzungen. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Gemeinschaftshaftung, Von 
Birgit Schoißwohl, Springer Verlag Wien/New York, 2002, 512 Seiten. 
19 The Banana Dispute: An Economic and Legal Analysis. Von Fritz Breuss, Stefan 
Griller, Erich Vranes (Hrsg.), ca 400 Seiten (2003). 
20 External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in the European Union, Von 
Stefan Griller, Birgit Weidel (Hrsg.), Springer Verlag Wien/New York, 2002, 500 
Seiten. 
21 Wachstumseffekte der Europäischen Integration, Von Harald Badinger, Springer 
Verlag Wien / New York 2003, 235 Seiten. 
22 The European System of Central Banks: An Autonomous Actor? The Quest for an 
Institutional Balance in EMU, Barbara Dutzler, Vienna / New York (Springer) 
2003, 293 pages.  
23 Institutional, Legal and Economic Aspects of the EMU, Von Fritz Breuss, Gerhard 
Fink, Stefan Griller (Hrsg.), Springer Verlag Wien / New York 2003, 346 Seiten. 
24 Russia – Continuity and Change, Hans-Georg Heinrich, Gerald Hinteregger 
(Hrsg.), Springer Verlag Wien / New York 2004, IV and 549 pages. 
25 Access to Affordable Medicines. Developing Responses under the TRIPS 
Agreement and EC Law, Katharina Gamharter, Wien / New York (Springer) 
2004, X and 303 pages. 
26 Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Rahmen der 
europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur, Kathrin Blanck, Wien / New York (Springer) 
2005, XI und 390 Seiten. 
 
 
